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INTRODUCTION: INVITATION TO REFORM PARENTAGE LAW
The Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary School of Law, which
convened a roundtable on reforming parentage laws ("Parentage Roundtable"), has
graciously invited me to respond to a set of academic papers presented at the Parentage
Roundtable and published by the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal ("Parentage
* Bruce C. Hafen Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University (BYU). BYU law students Tracy Schofield, Zachary Starr, and Kevin Fiet pro-
vided valuable research assistance for this Article. Some members of the Case Western
Reserve Law School faculty responded to an early draft of this Article I presented at a Faculty
Works-in-Progress seminar on February 21, 2006; I express my appreciation to those faculty
members who attended, asked questions, and provided feedback, especially to Professor
George Dent. I also express my gratitude to Professor James G. Dwyer of William & Mary
School of Law, who graciously invited me to prepare and submit this Article, and to Professor
Brad Wilcox of the University of Virginia, a participant in the Institute of Bill of Rights
Law's Task Force Roundtable: Reforming Parentage Laws, who initiated that invitation.
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Symposium"), to add my own recommendation regarding "[w]hat would be an ideal
set of rules for assigning newborn children to parents?"' The convener of the Parentage
Roundtable, James G. Dwyer, Cabell Research Professor of Law at the William &
Mary School of Law, asked the distinguished participants in the Parentage Roundtable
to consider how law regulating the establishment of parentage for the newborn child
would look if (1) only the best interests of the newborn child were considered, and
(2) assuming that social conditions as they now exist (as unpleasant as they are in
some situations) continue (thus precluding change-the-facts-by-assuming-miraculous-
new-governmental-programs-or-socio-economic-improvements fantasy-solutions).2
Professor Dwyer also explicitly asked that contributors engage in a free-thinking
"thought experiment"'3 to pursue a purely intellectual exercise in hopes of
"trigger[ing] stimulating debate among family law scholars and among many other
scholars and professionals. 4
This article addresses the subject of establishing legal parentage at the time of child-
birth within the context of the broader debate over the relationship of form and sub-
stance in family law. The article also proposes some reforms to parentage principles and
doctrines in the spirit of stimulating debate and encouraging family law scholars to ex-
plore approaches that break through the popular ideological barriers that often tend to
dominate and constrain contemporary thinking and discourse about family law. Part I
of this article reviews the six published papers by seven professors that resulted from the
Parentage Roundtable, and provides three comments about the positions asserted
(endorsing the child-centered approach, critiquing "mother-controls" proposals, and
criticizing the weakening of the marital presumption of parentage). Part RI of this Article
examines whether the form or structure of parenting really matters for children, and, if
so, how it should matter for the law governing the establishment of parentage at birth.5
' William & Mary School of Law, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Program Archives,
http://www.wn.edu/law/ibrl/program-archive.shtnl (last visited Sept. 11,2006). The Parentage
Roundtable papers were published in a Symposium on Reforming Parentage Laws, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 843-986 (2006).
2 James G. Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach to Parentage Law, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 843, 843-46 (2006) [hereinafter Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach].
3 Id. at 853 (symposium "designed as a thought experiment" to consider "somewhat
radical" proposals).
4 Id. at 846; see also DavidD. Meyer, The Constitutionality of "Best Interests" Parentage,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 857 (2006) (participants were invited "to think creatively
and expansively").
' I assume herein that if form of parenting matters for children, it should matter for par-
entage law because parentage law should prefer, promote, and protect those forms of parent-
ing that lead most consistently to positive child-rearing benefits for children. Parentage law
should discourage and try to avoid those forms of parenting that consistently produce the
most painful and harmful child-rearing consequences for children. This assumption about the
role of law in regulating parent-child relations can be debated, but given the explicit direction
of the convener that all authors base their proposals on the protection of child-interests only,
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It emphasizes that because children generally do best when raised by their mother and
father who are married, the law should strongly encourage and prefer marital dual-
gender parenting. Part M11 of this article suggests some core principles that should
underlie parentage law applicable to the newborn child and offers, for brainstorming
discussion, some possible reform positions, with the caveat that pragmatic
considerations must temper and shape how those principles and any reform proposals
are applied in any given case. The Article concludes by endorsing the importance of
fostering marital, biological, dual-gendered parenting in parentage law.
I. REvIEw AND CRITIQUE OF THE WILLIAM & MARY PARENTAGE ROUNDTABLE
A. Review of the Papers Presented
Articles published in the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Parentage Sympo-
sium provide a fairly representative selection of what knowledgeable and highly-
respected American legal scholars think of the law regulating parentage today and
of what it should be. Professor Karen Czapanskiy proposes to give birth mothers
virtually unilateral control of legal parentage.6 Under her proposal, the birth mother
would be the only presumed legal parent.7 She would be
empowered to decide whether she will be the child's sole legal
parent or whether she will designate another as her parental partner.
If she decides to designate a partner, she can designate whomever
she wants; she is not constrained by presumptions in favor of her
spouse or the child's biological father.8
A few other adults could petition a court to obtain parentage rights.9 Professor
Czapanskiy's proposal would facilitate single-mother parenting, parenting by lesbian
(but not gay) partners, and multi-generational parenting by the mother's choice, but
it would weaken marital parenting. 0 She argues that this is justified by her "inter-
dependency theory.""
Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach, supra note 2, at 843-45, fuller analysis of that
assumption must be reserved for another occasion.
6 Karen Czapanskiy, To Protect and Defend: Assigning Parental Rights When Parents
Are Living In Poverty, 14 WM. & MARY BiLL RTs. J. 943,943 (2006) [hereinafter Czapanskiy,
Protect and Defend].
7 Id. at 946.
8 Id. at 943.
9 Id. at 946.
10 Id. at 949-66.
" Id. at 947-48. While Professor Czapanskiy's analysis and proposal are probably the
most feminist-centric in the Parentage Symposium, her briefly-described "interdependency
2006]
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Professor Nancy Dowd also agrees that the mother-child relationship is the core
and foundation of families and should be the basis of parentage law. 2 She would
make marital status irrelevant for parentage determination. a. She would presume
that biological fathers are entitled to parentage unless they were absent from the
delivery without a good excuse (transforming a recent American cultural phenome-
non into a near-absolute requirement for legal parentage), refused to acknowledge
paternity, failed to care adequately, or acted abusively prior to birth.'4 She would
allow multiple men to have parental status and would separate social from economic
paternity.' 5 She also endorses mother-control-of-parentage-"lite" by requiring the
mother's signature on an unwed father's acknowledgment of paternity in order for
him to get paternal status,' 6 and by requiring other putative fathers to reside with the
child for two years and to "openly h[o]ld out the child as his own" (which, in most
cases would require consent of the child's mother who normally would have custody
under the prevailing custody practice).' 7
Summarizing proposals and analysis that are developed in much greater detail
in his recently published monograph entitled The Relationship Rights of Children,8
Professor Dwyer's Parentage Symposium article also endorses a version of the "mother-
control" rule; he would allow a not-unfit man married to the birth mother to auto-
matically obtain legal parentage (regardless of biological parentage) "so long as the
birth mother consents to his becoming the legal father."' 9 Professor Dwyer advocates
establishing rules that start with an assumption of parentage for some, but not all
theory" seems to have the potential to make a valuable contribution to the discussion of
parentage law if the ideological gender-bias were eliminated. Id.
12 Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. &
MARY BuLRTs. J. 909 (2006). Professor Dowd predicates parentage on nurturing, which she
explicitly equates with mothering. Id. at 913, 918. Given that premise, it is ironic that her
article focuses almost entirely on establishment of paternity and largely ignores (except for
one page) the establishment of parentage for women. While giving lip service to equality,
Dowd apparently would give birthmothers legal parentage without any evidence of nurturing
other than carrying the child and giving birth, absent abusive behavior. Id. at 930.
'3 Id. at 911,917, 928-29. Yet, ironically, Professor Dowd would allow married men to
establish paternity by executing an acknowledgment of paternity without the mother co-
signing, but the mother's signature would be required for an unmarried man to establish
paternity by acknowledgment. Id. at 935.
14 Id. at 925.
"5 Id. at 913, 917-21, 927-31.
16 Id. at 935.
'I ld. at 933.
1 JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006) [hereinafter
DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS].
"9 Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach, supra note 2, at 848; see also DWYER, RELATION-
SHIP RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 265 ("Men can become legal parents automatically, without
petitioning, only if they are married to the birth mother and the mother consents to their
parenthood."); id. at 259-62, 266.
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biological parents. Those that are deemed high-risk (including those who were younger
than 18 years of age when the child was born, or who are parents to four other chil-
dren and on welfare) are required to petition a court for an order of parentage.2 °
Courts could "deny legal parenthood in the first instance to some biological parents
on the grounds of unfitness," 2' such as by making "a 'substituted judgment' for the
child, which would effectively amount to a best-interests determination. 22
Professor David D. Meyer expresses cautious support for child-centered theories
and parentage reform proposals.23 After reviewing the movement away from strict par-
entage rules and toward greater "best interests" decision-making in parentage law,24
Professor Meyer reviews the cases that protect what he calls the "parental identity" of
traditional parents (biological and marital), 25 but suggests that "some Supreme Court
authority.. . seems to... suggest that states do indeed have broad authority in defin-
ing the scope of parenthood., 26 Nonetheless, any parentage rule must fairly treat all
who have significant interests in the determination of parentage in order to pass
constitutional muster,27 and "to the extent parentage reform proposals would place
significant barriers in the path of persons regarded as 'parents' by widely shared
social consensus, it will trigger serious constitutional review.9
28
Professor Jane C. Murphy cautions against the optimistic, statist belief that greater
state intervention in establishing parentage will benefit poor children.29 Acknowledging
the complexities of determining parentage today and the variety of contexts in which
parentage questions arise, she distinguishes parentage cases involving competing claims
to parentage from those involving efforts to "resolv[e] the legal status of the one adult
20 Dwyer, A Child-CenteredApproach, supra note 2, at 848. While many of the nine ex-
amples of unfitness Dwyer outlines seem to mirror existing child protection laws (e.g., abuse,
neglect, and dependency), which would allow prompt termination of parental rights soon after
a child's birth. Two of the grounds for denial of parentage described in the text above are very
troubling. For the widowed mother of a newborn child, whose husband recently died leaving
her with four other children and in temporary need of welfare assistance, this proposal would
add to the burdens of grief over loss of a spouse the additional legal, financial, and emotional
difficulty of having to convince a court that she is deserving to be deemed a legal parent of her
newborn child. Likewise, while the advantages of waiting until majority to marry and have chil-
dren are profound, it is quite dubious to assume that the immaturity of youthful parentage alone
causes such a great harm to minors as to justify creation of a presumption against parentage.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 849.
23 Meyer, supra note 4, at 857-58.
24 Id. at 859-64.
25 Id. at 864-67.
26 Id. at 869.
27 Id. at 878-79.
28 Id. at 874.
29 Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by Preserving Parenthood, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 969, 969-73 (2006).
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who may be available to serve as the legal mother or father" of a child.3' She empha-
sizes the risks to children of their fathers or mothers losing parental status, the in-
adequacies of the state as a substitute parent, and the benefits to the child of having at
least one biological parent acknowledged as a legal parent.3" She argues that federal law
requiring prompt termination of parental rights has benefitted a few children who have
become available for adoption,32 but that many more (than necessary to be protected)
have been deprived of at least marginal parenting by their mothers due to hasty ter-
mination of parental rights.33 Such children have suffered the state-inflicted deprivation
resulting from parentless child-rearing in foster care, group homes, etc.' Based on her
review of the experience of poor women and their treatment in child neglect and abuse
proceedings, Murphy asserts that "there is considerable risk to children in requiring
mothers to seek state intervention to establish parentage. 35 She concludes by arguing
against formal state intervention to establish parentage by showing fitness, by suggesting
different standards for paternity and maternity reflecting the differences in prenatal
investment, by endorsing presumed parentage of the birth mother, and by deferring to
poor families to make their own decisions about parentage issues whenever possible.36
Addressing the question, "Who should care for children when their biological
parents cannot?", sociologist W. Bradford Wilcox and law professor Robin Fretwell
Wilson present the empirical and legal case that "children would be best served by
placement with married parents and, barring this, that they should be placed with a
single parent; as a final resort, a child should be placed with an unmarried, cohabiting
couple for adoption by both of them. 37 They assert with some impressive empirical
evidence that "[t]he social science is clear: on average, children do best in a married
home, compared to the alternatives. ' '38 The authors review recent studies indicating
that single parenting and non-marital couple parenting are less beneficial for children
than marital parenting and explain those findings in terms of "social networks, the social
and emotional support and monitoring of a co-parent, and parental quality."39 Likewise,
they summarize some of the evidence that children raised by cohabiting parents are
less advantaged than children raised by married couples and explain why in terms
of lowered institutionalized social support, lowered commitment, less shared
30 Id. at 969, 971.
31 Id. at 972-73.
32 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115; see
42 U.S.C. § 675 (2005).
13 Murphy, supra note 29, at 978-79.
34 Id.
31 Id. at 982. Her paper focuses exclusively on motherhood. Id. at 973.
36 Id. at 983-86.
37 W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby: Adoption, Marriage,
and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 883, 883 (2006).
38 Id. at 883; see also id. at 891-99.
39 Id. at 897; see also id. at 895-97.
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understanding about parental roles and responsibilities, and higher levels of instability.'
They recommend that states adopt any of several rules that support or prefer placement
of children for adoption with married couples."
Thus, the Parentage Symposium articles did not all address the same question
about what rules should govern establishment of legal parentage at birth. Professor
Murphy focused primarily on termination of parental rights of poor, single mothers,42
and Professors Wilcox and Wilson focused on establishing parentage for parentless
children (abandoned, neglected, abused or dependent orphans).43 Nonetheless, all
of the papers addressed issues that relate to the general topic of reforming the laws
regulating establishment of legal parentage at birth.
B. Commendation of Child-Centered Approach in Reforming Parentage Law
The Parentage Roundtable and resulting Parentage Symposium have made an
important contribution to the discussion of parentage law reform by emphasizing the
importance of taking a child-centered approach to legal regulation of the establishment
of parentage at the time of birth." Most of the symposium articles made at least a
partially successful effort to follow the admonition to frame parentage law reform
proposals or commentary from the perspective of protecting and promoting the interests
of children."
The child-centered approach is an important perspective to establish in the law
and to ingrain into the consciousness of academics and professionals who work with
children in need of protection and with the legal policies and programs designed to
help them. While this is not a new approach (it has been a part of the scholarly legal
literature at least since Barbara Bennett Woodhouse's classic 1993 law review article
Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights)," it still clearly
merits repetitive emphasis in current scholarly discussions.
The remaining problem is how to determine what really is in the best interests of
children. Almost any parentage policy position-from the most preposterous to the
most prudential--can be (and probably has been) defended in child-centered terms
and with the claim that it promotes the best interests of children.47 "Child centered
40 Id. at 899-903.
41 Id. at 904-07.
42 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
4 Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach, supra note 2, at 843-44.
45 Id.; Meyer, supra note 4, at 857-58; Murphy, supra note 29, at 971-73; Wilcox &
Wilson, supra note 37, at 883, 891-97; see also Dowd, supra note 12, at 917-19.
4 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747 (1993).
47 See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1427-28 (1994) (responding to claims
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analyses are popular, and for good reason. Children are typically understood to be
innocent actors. Therefore, to propose legal reforms centered on their interests is to
stand on unassailable ground."48 Adopting a child-centered approach only identi-
fies the issues; it does not determine any particular policy solution.49
For example, pro-life and pro-choice advocates have been dueling for at least
three decades over parental notification or consent requirements, with each side
arguing that state-mandated parental involvement (by prior notification or consent)
in the abortion decision of their pregnant daughter promotes or harms the welfare
of the young woman. ° Since parental notification results in fewer abortions, it is
highly unlikely Planned Parenthood will ever agree that parental notification is in
the best interests of children generally. Similarly, absence of parental participation
results in more abortions, making it highly unlikely that the National Right to Life
Committee will ever agree it is in the best interests of children to allow abortions
on minors without parental notification or consent. We are likely to see peace in
the Middle East before we see the contesting sides agree about whether parental
notification prior to abortions performed on minors is a child-centered policy.
The problem is that "best" (as in "a child's best interests")" is a normative term that
depends on some external standard or reference. What is "best" largely depends upon
what normative criteria are used to make that determination. As Professor Mnookin
demonstrated many years ago, a child-centered legal standard (such as "best interests of
the child") invariably generates indeterminacy.5 2 Mnookin's argument is based on
that parents' religiosity promotes child welfare). For some examples of proposals asserted to
promote child-centered policies, see Christina Dugger Sommer, Note, Empowering Children:
Granting Foster Children the Right to Initiate Parental Rights Termination Proceedings,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 1200 (1994); David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial
Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 345, 350 n.34 (1994)
(arguing that lesbian mothers are more child-centered than other parents).
48 Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian Centered Critique of "Genetic Parenthood", 9 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 591,598 (2006).This source is selected for the widely-recognized proposition
quoted in the text because it is well-stated and asserts a dubious position with which I
strongly disagree. Child-centeredness is a standard that can be raised in almost any camp. It
is not the only standard with that distinction.
"9 Ira C. Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1317, 1327 (1994) (adopting "a more child-centered view of the family and our
social future ... [still leaves] a set of uneasy choices").
50 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Planned Parenthood Ass'n
of Kan. City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird
(II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
' Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 260 (1975).
52 Id.
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the fact that: (1) there is not one universally-embraced theory of what is "best" for
children (some say social development matters most; others prefer physical develop-
ment, intellectual development, artistic development, moral or spiritual develop-
ment, and/or well-roundedness or balance ); (2) there is no fully reliable predictive
criteria for what steps taken during child-rearing will result in any given child having
any particular characteristics or qualities in the future; and (3) even if there was a
consensus about what is "best" for child development and even if a reliable pre-
dictive theory for developing those qualities in children existed, our fact-finding
capacities (especially in contested litigation before overburdened courts involving
hostile contestants with differing resources and capacities to present evidence) are
far from perfect and frustrate our attempt to promote the "best interests" of children.
Thus, a child-centered rule of decision, such as "best interests," merely moves the
problem to another level. The determination of what is deemed the "best interests"
of the child is quite subjective. It depends heavily on what set of normative standards,
theories, and predictive assumptions are used, and that depends largely on who is
making the decision. Thus, to adopt a child-centered rule boils down, in many cases,
to a let-the-person-authorized-to-determine-what-is-best bring and apply his or her
subjective normative values to decide what is "best" for the child. To move from an
objective rule for determining legal parentage, such as biological parentage or marriage
to the biological mother, to a child-centered standard, such as "best interests of the
child," effectively makes the decision about establishing parentage much more sub-
jective, indeterminate, and unpredictable. It also transfers the decision-making power
from the hands of the most interested parties (who can choose to engage in procreative
behavior or to marry) into the hands of third parties (judges or administrative officials
appointed by and representing the state) who will be heavily influenced by (if not
deciding the question according to) their own personal normative values or the
normative values popular in the state. Adopting a "best interests of the child" rule
for establishing parentage certainly raises serious constitutional questions, as well.53
Thus, a child-centered rule for establishing parentage would be a strongly statist
proposal, favoring state control over private relational ordering. Until now, state inter-
vention to make such decisions has been used only when there is clear evidence of
need for child protection-primarily because of the breakdown or dysfunction of the
family (such as abuse, neglect, or dependency). One reason for the non-intervention
presumption has been that the state has proven inconsistent, and sometimes incompetent,
at providing better child-raising environments for children than many marginal parents,
and even some abusive and neglectful parents.54 State intervention always involves
some form of harm to the child and often results in long-term abusive foster care or
institutional care for the child.55
" Some of the parents' rights cases and principles are reviewed and discussed by Professor
Meyer, supra note 4, at 864-79.
Murphy, supra note 29, at 976-83.
5 See Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of
2006]
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However, the Parentage Symposium did not require participants to propose child-
welfare-based parentage rules. Rather, Professor Dwyer tried "to constrain the partici-
pants to a purely child-centered analysis of parentage laws."56 The distinction may
seem subtle, but it is quite important. Child-centered analysis requires making consid-
eration of the welfare of the child the center of the analysis, the principal or main focus,
and the core policy consideration, not the exclusive consideration or solitary perspective.
(That is not only reasonable; it may be the only reasonable approach to setting public
policy regarding establishment of parentage of children at birth.) Such child-centered
analysis does not require adopting rules that allow judges or other state officials to
decide critical issues in the name of doing what they think is best rather than the private
parties who are connected to the child, nor does it mandate overriding the many other
constitutional interests that are implicated when a child is born, and which indirectly
may have a great impact on promoting the ultimate best interests of children.
C. Critique of the Revival of Gender Discrimination in Family Law
Three of the six Parentage Symposium articles assert variations on the law-should-
prefer-mothers-over-fathers general theme that has been popular with some of the first
generation of post-modem feminism,57 including the mothers-should-control-who-
Children, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (1996) (arguing that many imperfect and some seriously defi-
cient parents provide something for their children that state substitutes usually cannot provide).
56 Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach, supra note 2, at 844 (emphasis added).
51 See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW 132 (2000) (parent-child legal relations rather than marriage should occupy the
"moral center of family law"); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 101-233 (1995) (asserting
that the mother-child dyad is the core of the family and that the law should abolish marriage
and recognize the mother-child dyad as the basic family form instead); MONA HARRINGTON,
CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY PoLrrIcs (1999) (advocating for a new
culture of care dependant on the family, private employers, and the government-not on the
"unpaid labor of women in the home"); BARBARA KATz ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHER-
HOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989) (adopting a system
of parentage rights in which "children 'belong to' the mother and the mother's spouse, if she has
one, at the time of birth"); Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 809 (1998) (defending and redefining the institutions of marriage and
family based on "concepts of fairness and family welfare," not morality); Karen Czapanskiy,
Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 957 (1999) [hereinafter
Czapanskiy, Interdependencies] (advancing an "interdependency theory" in which every child
needs a care giver and every care giver needs support from other persons and institutions); see also
DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 18; Czapanskiy, Protect and Defend, supra note 6;
Dowd, supra note 12; Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach, supra note 2. See generally
Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REv. 227 (2006) (taking a functionalist approach to the
presumption of legitimacy and advocating for a modernized version for both traditional and
[Vol. 15:203
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becomes-a-legal-parent position. Thus, one-half of the Parentage Symposium articles
endorse the gender-discriminatory rule that the law should give preference and
priority to one gender over the other regarding establishment of parentage at birth."
All three of those articles also endorse some form of mothers-control-who-else-
is-legally-recognized-as-parent rule. That would effect a significant transformation
of existing (and centuries of) parentage law that has recognized both the (presumed)
biological mother and the (presumed) biological father as legal parents. It would em-
brace an overt gender preference in family law close on the heels of three decades
of vigorous rejection of gender preferences in family law.
The mothers-control-who-gets-legal-parentage position seems to be fundamentally
inconsistent with a long line of Supreme Court decisions rejecting legal discrimination
based on gender and invalidating legal preferences for one gender based on social
stereotypes or gender-preferring social policies.59 Laws embodying generalizations
about gender that perpetuate the same "outmoded notions of the relative capabilities
lesbian couples); Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of
Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 3 n.2 (2004) ("This
article endorses a family structure in which mothers hold initial rights and obligations but
fathers almost always share those rights and obligations."); Meredith Render, The Man, The
State and You: The Role of the State in Regulating Gender Hierarchies, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 73 (2006) (explaining the implications of the "regulation" vs. "governance"
debate in the context of gender discrimination).
58 Based on my review of the recent law review literature about parentage and my own
subjective perception of the policy preferences of current family law teachers, I would estimate
at least one-half (and probably closer to two-thirds) of current family law teachers would favor
a gender-based (mothers-control) parentage policy of some sort.
" See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (state military college policy to
admit only men violates Equal Protection Clause); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (use of peremptory challenges by state to exclude men from jury hearing paternity case
violates Equal Protection Clause); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (state
university admission policy that allows only women to enroll violates Equal Protection Clause);
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (community property law providing that men are
the "head and master" of the community estate violates Equal Protection Clause); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (law allowing adoption without consent of unwed father, but
not unwed mother, violates Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (state law
allowing women, but not men, to seek alimony upon divorce violates Equal Protection Clause);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state law providing that women may obtain beer at age
eighteen, but men at twenty-one, violates Equal Protection Clause); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7 (1975) (different ages for majority of men and women violates Equal Protection Clause);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (social security provision providing certain
unemployment benefits to women, but not men, violates Equal Protection Clause); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (law requiring husbands, but not wives, of military service
personnel to prove dependency violates Equal Protection Clause); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (law presuming fathers, but not mothers, of children born out of wedlock to be unfit
is unconstitutional); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statutory preference for males over
females in administration of estates violates Equal Protection Clause).
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of men and women... [have been] invalidated [by the Court] in [many] contexts."' '
While actual, demonstrable differences between men and women or demonstrable
historical disadvantages may justify some gender-differentiating laws that reflect
those specific gender differences or compensate for those proven disadvantages,6'
those laws must be carefully tailored to correlate the gender discrimination with the
compelling and immutable actual gender difference or proven disadvantage.62 Giving
control of legal parentage to one gender or the other reflects no inherent biological
distinction and compensates for no established historical disadvantage, but it merely
seems to reflect a popular new form of gender discrimination (favoring women).
One is hard-pressed to find any legal policy assigning control of a legal decision on
the basis of gender that the Court has upheld. The only example that readily comes to
mind is that of abortion, where the Court has in a couple of cases struck down laws
designed to protect the rights and interests of fathers of unbom children to participate
in the decision whether to destroy their living offspring. 63 But in those cases, the Court
viewed the issue as a zero-sum question in which it had to uphold the unilateral decision
of one parent or the other, and it opted to give the decision-making power to the one
who would be most directly and physically impacted (thus, an impact-driven decision,
not a gender-driven rule).' Of course, legal parentage is not zero-sum. Dual-parenting
is and has long been the legal and social standard in this country, its legal progenitors,
and throughout the world. Moreover, the Court would be strained tojustify a policy
60 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.11 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)).
61 See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (immigration law, which makes it more
difficult for children born out of the United States to an American man and non-American
woman to obtain citizenship than children born to an American woman and alien man, does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (immigration
law imposing stricter proof-of-paternity requirements upon foreign children of American men
than children of American women does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (adoption law, which denies notice of adoption to father, but
not mother, of child born out of wedlock, yet provides multiple legal options to men to insure
notice, is not unconstitutional); see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (social
security provision, which allows women to exclude more years of low-earnings in computing
average income, is justified by fact of historically lower-paying work opportunities available
to women).
62 See generally Virginia F. Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness: Why "Real Differ-
ence" Jurisprudence Lacks "Support" and What Can Be Done About It, 36 U. TOLL. REv. 273
(2005). While this article contains a fine review of the case law, it reaches a naively erroneous
conclusion, mistaking a non-gendered factual recognition of the impact of female nudity upon
men for legal adoption of "a distinctly heterosexual male perspective" that is "socially
imposed." Id. at 279. That is like saying that a city ordinance requiring that lions and bears be
kept in cages but not domestic dogs and cats improperly adopts the perspective of dogs and
cats. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481 (2004).
63 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6' Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71; Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98.
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giving a biological mother veto power over the attempt of a biological father to
claim parentage when it has rejected a state spousal-consent law precisely because
it gave parents of one gender a legal veto power over a decision of the other.65 Further-
more, abortion is sui generis, so cases upholding a woman's right to avoid enduring
an unwanted pregnancy and having an unwanted child are hardly compelling
authority for giving biological parents of one gender a right to bar parents of the
other gender with exactly the same claim to biological-parental connectedness from
claiming legal parentage.
More importantly, and in keeping with tiie focus of the convener's request to
maintain a child-centered focus, both the general "mothers-matter-more-for-successful-
child-rearing" premise and the specific "mothers-control-who-gets-legal-parentage"
proposals would be disastrous for millions of children. The former continues the tragic
post-modem feminist tradition of denying, if not denigrating, the importance of fathers
to the welfare of their children. It stubbornly perpetuates an ideological position that
simply defies the large and growing body of empirical research that has confirmed the
unique and tremendously beneficial contributions of fathers to child-development
and child well-being, and that has documented the multiple kinds of harms and deficits
of father-absent child-rearing.6 The latter proposal, which gives mothers at least veto
power if not unilateral power of appointment over paternity, is an extreme example of
putting the perspectives of adults (in this case, the theoretical fantasies of some fem-
inists) over the needs and welfare of children. It would substitute an adult-centered, ide-
ology-driven perspective for a child-centered, child-needs-driven approach to solving
the dilemma of parentage.
While many children, especially (but not exclusively) children in poor minority
communities, already are born and grow up in father-absent households, that tragedy
cries for correction rather than legal expansion. In addition to its coercive, regulatory,
protective, and remedial functions, family law serves very important facilitative, chan-
neling, and expressive functions. Parentage law is intended to channel behavior and
relationships into the most beneficial paths and forms, to facilitate and support non-
legal institutions and relationships that benefit society and its families, and to articulate,
teach, and foster community normative precepts, ideals, and understandings about
successful, healthy, and happy family relationships and behaviors. 67 From those per-
spectives, the proposal to exclude fathers from legal parentage without the approval
of birth mothers would likely increase the incidence of the tragedy of fatherless child-
rearing, further alienate men from responsible fatherhood, and exacerbate the harms
of single-parent child-rearing to both children and parents.
65 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69-71.
66 See infra Part H.
67 See generally CARLE. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INvITATION TO FAMILY
LAW 194-204 (2d ed. 2000); Lynn D. Wardle, Fragile Families and Family Law, in FRAGILE
FAMILIEs AND THE MARRIAGE AGENDA 73 (Lori Kowaleski-Jones & Nicholas H. Wolfinger
eds., 2006).
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The mothers-control-who-gets-legal-parentage proposals reflect the bare, gendered
assumption that all women who get pregnant and do not succumb to social incentives
to abort are going to be good, responsible parents, and that no men who father children
(even if married) are equally (or more) likely to be equally good (or better) parents.
That is strikingly inaccurate, stunningly overbroad, and patently unconstitutional. It
also disregards the needs of children.
Depriving a child of contact with one of his or her parents is a very disturbing
practice that is taken very seriously in American law.68 For example, if parents divorce
when a child is an infant or if that child is born out of wedlock, the law still seeks to
foster, protect, and promote the relationships between the child and his or her non-
custodial parent through many policies and programs including joint-custody policies,
presumptions and preferences (in effect in over forty states), 69 and "parenting plan"
' Monica K. Miller, Through the Eyes of a Father: How PRWORA Affects Non-Resident
Fathers and Their Children, 20 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 55, 60 (2006) ("Critics feel that
neglecting fathers' access to their children is a major weakness in the system. Since father in-
volvement has [an] important impact on children's educational and economic attainment, delin-
quent behaviour, and psychological well-being, development of programmes that increase
parent-child visitations may benefit children." (citation omitted)).
' Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforce-
ment, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 325, 337-38 (2005) [hereinafter
Murphy, Legal Images] ("In the area of custody, one of the first developments of this kind
was the introduction of the concept ofjoint custody. The first joint custody statute was passed
in 1979 in California, and most states eventually followed suit, either by joint custody statutes
or through case law. While many scholars have critiqued the implementation ofjoint custody
statutes, the enactment of such statutes reflects a legal recognition of fathers' roles as care-
takers of their children." (citations omitted)); id. at 337 n.59 (listing forty-one states that
permit joint custody, at least twelve of which allow courts to order joint custody over the ob-
jection of one or both of the parents); Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint
Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455,455 n.2 (1984) (noting and critiquing the substantial body of
literature favoringjoint custody and the accelerating movement for joint custody presumption
laws); Stephanie N. Barnes, Comment, Strengthening the Father-Child Relationship Through
a Joint Custody Presumption, 35 Wn.LAMETrEL. REv. 601,602-03 (1999) ("A presumption
ofjoint custody, on the other hand, encourages both parents to initiate and continue parenting
roles that help their children develop into healthy, stable, and happy adults.... [C]ourts should
begin with the presumption that children and parents benefit most when both father and
mother maintain physical, decisional, and authoritative presences while raising their children.
Joint legal custody allows a father the opportunity to make important decisions regarding his
children's daily lives, thereby fulfilling the father's need to remain involved in the children's
lives while also enhancing the father-child bond. In addition, joint physical custody, when
practical, prevents fathers from evolving into distant voices on the telephone or stereotypical
weekend-activity planners. Joint custody may also increase fathers' compliance with child
support orders. Joint legal and physical custody benefits mothers in several ways as well. By
sharing child care responsibilities with fathers, mothers can foster their own independence
by working outside the home, advancing their education, and developing personal relation-
ships."); Brian J. Melton, Note, Solomon's Wisdom or Solomon's Wisdom Lost: Child Custody
[Vol. 15:203
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN PARENTAGE LAW
policies and laws (in effect in nearly half of the states).7" Custody law says to the
parents, "if you do not want to have contact with each other, that is fine; but it is very
important that the child have the opportunity to develop a parental relationship with
each parent, and neither of you has the right to deprive the child of that." That policy
is reflected in a variety of laws, including laws about standing, paternity, visitation,
child support, and interstate jurisdiction, as well as laws by agencies designed to
support and facilitate visitation, even if the parents do not get along with each
other.7' If the custodial parent interferes with visitation by the non-custodial parent,
or vice-versa, it is taken very seriously. There are many cases in which courts have
switched which parent has custody in order to ensure that the child is allowed to
have a parental relationship with the other parent.72 A variety of tort claims have
been recognized to provide relief against the parent interfering with the other
parent's parent-child relationship.73 Courts can and sometimes do impose contempt
in North Dakota-A Presumption that Joint Custody Is in the Best Interests of the Child in
Custody Disputes, 73 N.D. L. REV. 263,274 n.68 (1997) ("[J]oint custody provides the child
with [the] love, attention, training, and influence of both parents.").
70 See, e.g., Murphy, Legal Images, supra note 69, at 338-39 ("Another development over
the last decade that has promoted involvement of fathers in children's lives when parents live
apart is the growing use ofcourt-ordered "parenting classes" in custody cases. "Parenting plans"
emphasize the importance of both parents in caretaking of children by requiring the parties to
delineate each parent's responsibilities for the care of the children and decisions about educa-
tion, health care, and discipline. About thirteen states currently require parties to submit pro-
posed parenting plans prior to a grant of custody. Another nine states and the District of Columbia
have statutes that give judges discretion to require parenting plans in custody cases.").
7' See generally Murphy, Legal Images, supra note 69, at 335-41.
72 Many jurisdictions conclude that interference with visitation is grounds for a change of
custody. See Edward B. Borris, Interference with Parental Rights of Noncustodial Parent as
Grounds for Modification of Child Custody, 9 DIVORCE LrNG. 1 (1997) (reviewing cases and
finding that most states consider consistent interference with visitation appropriate grounds for
a change in primary custody); see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (1)(c) (West 2001) ("[T]he
denial by one parent of the child's opportunity for maximum continuing contact with the other
parent, without just cause, [shall be considered] a significant factor in determining the proper
custody arrangement."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(e) (1996) ("Repeated unreasonable denial
of or interference with visitation rights ... granted [to a parent] ... may be considered a material
change of circumstances which justifies modification of a prior order of [child] custody.");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(c) (West 2001) (modification of custody order statute provides that
the court "shall not prohibit a motion to modify a custody order or parenting plan if [it] finds
that there is persistent and willful denial or interference with parenting time"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-219(l),(8) (2001) (allowing modification of custody if the custodial parent has
interfered with noncustodial parent's exercise of visitation rights); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.260(2) (West 1997) (same, with addition that the non-moving party has been found in
contempt of court at least twice in the past two years or has been convicted of custodial inter-
ference in the first or second degree).
71 See generally CAL. FAM. CODE § 3028 (West 2005) (court may order compensation for
custodial or visitation interference); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1976) (tort claim
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sanctions for interference with visitation or custody.7" Likewise, if the non-custodial
parent interferes with custody or visitation by keeping the children longer than allowed
or absconding with the child, the law takes those behaviors very seriously. Criminal
prosecution may result because our laws recognize how important it is for the
child to have the opportunity to develop a parental relationship with both parents.75
"Currently, almost every state criminally forbids custodial interference by parents or
relatives of the child."76 If one parent attempts to alienate the child from the other
for interference with custody); Linda L. Berger, Lies Between Mommy and Daddy: The Case
for Recognizing Spousal Emotional Distress Claims Based on Domestic Deciet that Inter-
feres with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449 (2000); Joy M. Feinberg
& Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: Alternative Remedies, 12 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 271 (1994); Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, Visitation Abuse v Unlawful Visitation
Interference-Is There Comfortfor Noncustodial Parents?, 91 ILL. B.J. 450 (2003); Recent
Case, Family Law-Child Support Orders-Court May Terminate Child Support Order if
Custodial Parent Intentionally Interferes with Visitation Rights-In re Marriage of
Boudreaux, 201 Cal. App. 3d 447, 247 Cal. Rptr 234 (6th Dist. 1988), 102 HARV. L. REV.
920 (1989); Eve Kahao Gonzalez, Note, Intentional Interference With Visitation Rights-Is
this a Tort?: Owens v. Owens, 47 LA. L. REV. 217 (1986); William L. Hill, Note, Tort
Recovery for Intentional Interference with Visitation Rights: A Necessary Alternative, 32 U.
LouisvnE J. FAM. L. 657 (1993-94); Jesse E. Weisshaar, Note, Does Loss of Custody of
a Child Resulting from Attorney Negligence Cause Damage?, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1333 (2005).
14 Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to
Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 981 n.300 (citing JEFFERY M. LEvING, FATHERS' RIGHTS:
HARD-HrrrING & FAIR ADVICE FOR EVERY FATHER INVOLVED IN A CUSTODY DISPUTE 7
(1997) ("Sanctions imposed to punish violation of a family court's visitation orders can include
fines, forfeiture of child support, and sometimes incarceration.")); see, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.400.7 (West 2003) (providing for application of court's powers of contempt when a
parent interferes with custody); Morgan v. Foretich, 528 A.2d 425, 428-29 (D.C. 1987)
(upholding ajudgment of civil contempt when the mother refused to comply with a visitation
order); Smith v. Smith, 434 N.E.2d 749,753 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (affirming as not grossly
excessive a five-day civil contempt sentence against a mother for interfering with visitation).
" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.03 (West 2000) (interference with custody); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-45 (1999) (custodial interference criminal offense); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/10-5.5 (West 2002) (making "unlawful visitation interference" a petty offense); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-42-3-4 (West 1998) (criminalizing violations of custody orders by hiding, kid-
napping, or taking a child out of state); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-49.1(B) (West 2002) (wilful
violation of custody and visitation orders is Class 4 misdemeanor; second conviction within
twelve months is Class 3 misdemeanor); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.4, 1OA U.L.A.
430 (2001). See generally Nancy Levit, Matrimonial Torts and Crimes: An Annotated
Bibliography, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 117, 181 (2004).
76 Catherine F. Klein et al., Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and
Immigration ImplicationsforBattered Women Fleeing Across State Lines with Their Children,
39 FAM. L.Q. 109, 117 (2005). See generally Susan Kreston, Prosecuting International
Parental Kidnapping, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 533, 533 ("Parental kid-
napping is a crime, recognized as such in the United States by every state, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government.").
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parent, courts respond-very strongly, sometimes removing or significantly modifying
custody." In all states, these kinds of unilateral efforts by one parent to deprive a
child of a relationship with the other parent are clearly against public policy. If a
parent crosses state lines, federal criminal and civil laws, as well as many state laws,
may come into play, so serious is our concern about, inter alia, depriving the child of
the chance to develop a filial relationship with the other parent.78 For example, the
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, which denies interstate recognition to
custody decrees obtained by a parent who has abducted his or her child to another
state,7 9 amended the Fugitive Felon Act to make it applicable to parents who abduct or
retain their children in violation of state law,° and extended the Federal Parent Locator
Service to abducted children.8 Similarly, Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003,82 which
establishes criminal liability for attempting to remove a child from the United States
with the intent to interfere with another person's legal custody of the child. 3
Internationally, many nations (including the United States and most western nations)
have adopted the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction," designed to deter or remedy the wrongful removal by one parent of
' See Carol S. Bruch, Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation: Getting It
Wrong in Child Custody Cases, 35 FAM. L.Q. 527 (2001) (reviewing cases and critiquing
diagnostic theory of parental alienation syndrome); Andrew I. Schepard, Editorial Notes, 42
FAM. CT. REV. 607, 608 (2004) (noting recent debate over validity of diagnosis of parental
alienation syndrome); see also Daniel M. Fraidstem, Note, Croll v. Croll and the Unfortunate
Irony of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction:
Parents with "Rights ofAccess" Get No Rights to Access Courts, 30 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 641,
678 (2005) ("[It is enough [for contempt] to engage in behavior that undermines or alienates
a child's relationship with his or her noncustodial parent.").
78 See, e.g., Klein et al., supra note 76, at 112 (noting that the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, federal Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act, state criminal custody or visitation interference laws, and state civil
custody or visitation interference statutes may be implicated); Kreston, supra note 76, at 533
("Parental kidnapping is a crime, recognized as such in the United States by ... the federal
government."); id. at 537-39 (describing the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
responding to parental kidnapping); id. at 540 (describing the role of the Office of Children's
Issues of the Department of State in dealing with international parental kidnapping).
79 Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2001)).
80 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1983).
8" 42 U.S.C. § 663 (1983).
82 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in scattered sections 18, 21, 28,
and 42 U.S.C.).
83 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (2004).
'4 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 97, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,493 (Mar. 26, 1986).
As of Aug. 31, 2006, seventy-six countries had acceded to the Convention. Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Status Table, http://www.hcch.netrmdex-en.php?act=conventions
.status&cid=24 (last visited Sept. 25, 2006); see also Kreston, supra note 76, at 543 (describing
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
children from the place where they have resided with the other parent.8 5 Article 7 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) specifically recognizes the right of every
child, "as far as possible.... to know and be cared for by his or her parents."'86 Article
8 further protects "the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including...
family relations, 87 while Article 16 also guarantees to children "the right to the
protection of the law" against any "arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her
privacy, family, [or] home. 8' Likewise, Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights provides explicit protection of "private and family life, 89 which has
been interpreted to include the right of children to know their family origins and
identity.' ° All these, as well as many other state, federal, and international laws, empha-
size the importance of preserving the right of the child to grow up and develop a
sound parental relationship with both his or her mother and father.
In light of such long-established and widely-recognized precedents, the Parentage
Symposium proposals to allow one parent to deny his or her child a legal parental
relationship with the other parent is surprising. These proposals would make laws
regulating parent-child relations even more schizophrenic. Where the law goes to great
lengths to protect the child's right to a filial relationship with both parents in most
Hague Convention procedures for responding to international parental kidnapping).
85 See, e.g., Deborah M. Zawadzki, Note, The Role of Courts in Preventing International
Child Abduction, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 353 (2005).
86 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 7(1), U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 168, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1448 (1989), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/crc.pdf. Of course, the United
States, one of the few nations to treat such treaties as "hard law" as distinct from merely
aspiration and hortatory, has not signed the CRC.
87 Id., art. 8.
88 Id., art. 16.
89 "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his corre-
spondence." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
§ 1, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, CETS No. 005, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/
Treaties/Html/005.htm.
9 See Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspectives on Procreation and Parentage by Assisted
Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006); see also Jacqueline A. Laing & David
S. Oderberg, Artificial Reproduction, the 'Welfare Principle', and the Common Good, 13 MED.
L. REv. 328, 339 n.28 (2005). But see David D. Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children's
Relationship Rights, 11 WM. &MARY BnLRTs. J. 1117, 1135 (2003); Ya'ir Ronen, Redefining
the Child's Right to Identity, 18 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 147, 159-60 (2004). A similar
proscription of arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, or home (to the ICHR)
is contained in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
to which 148 nations, including the United States, have acceded. G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 17, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
See generally D. Marianne Blair, The Influence of International Conventions on Municipal
Adoption Law: The Disclosure Debate, 96 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PRoc. 193, 195 (2002).
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other conceivable circumstances, they would have the law simply ignore that right
and that need of children in the parentage context. It would be inconsistent with legal
policy in most other parent-child contexts, where the law is used to protect, facilitate,
and promote developing the child's relationship with his or her parents of both genders.
D. Criticism of Parentage Reform Proposals for Devaluing Dual-Gendered,
Marital Parenting
At least three of the parentage proposals would eliminate or significantly dimi-
nish the value of marriage as a factor in parentage determinations at child birth.9 On
the other hand, Professors Wilcox and Wilson make a compelling case that marital
child-rearing is in the best interests of children generally, and merits a presumption
or preference (at least in the adoption context, which was the only parentage context
those authors examined).92 The marital presumption has long been recognized in Anglo-
American law.93 However, in the wake of recent significant social changes regarding
sex, procreation, and marriage, including the increase in non-marital cohabitation,
the rise in childbearing out of wedlock, historically heightened rates of divorce, and
post-divorce waning of paternal parenting responsibility, the marital presumption has
eroded.94 Continued recognition and application of the marital presumption has become
a contested policy issue, and the divergent positions are clearly represented in these
Parentage Symposium papers and proposals.
Proposals to weaken or eliminate the marital presumption generally are myopic
and are clearly inconsistent with the child-centered approach the convener emphasized,
inasmuch as it would harm children. Marriage is a significant protective institution
91 Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, supra note 57, at 948 ("Under my proposal, the mother
is the only person accorded the presumption of parenthood."); id. at 951-55 (married mother
may, but is not required to, designate her husband as a parent); Dowd, supra note 12, at 917
("I would not maintain the marital presumption, or alternatively, not give it much weight.");
id. at 928-29 (marital presumption eliminated and replaced by social parentage notion); see
also DWYER, RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 265-66; Dwyer, A Child-Centered
Approach, supra note 2, at 848 (legal fatherhood conferred upon husband of married birth
mother only if she consents).
92 Wilcox & Wilson, supra note 37, at 891-904.
9' Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality opinion) (reviewing
history of marital presumption of paternity); W.LIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *434-47
(marital presumption of legitimacy at common law); see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 151-52 (2d ed. 1988) (reviewing
history of marital presumption and illegitimacy); HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW
AND SOCIAL PoLIcY 15-17 (1971) (good review of the history of the marital presumption and
illegitimacy); Baker, supra note 57, at 12-13 (short history of marital presumption); Murphy,
Legal Images, supra note 69, at 331-34 (review of history of marital presumption).
9' See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Pre-
sumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547 (2000).
20063
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
that benefits children.95 Recent social science scholarship corroborates the findings
of numerous earlier studies (some of which may have been less sophisticated in design)
that marital parenting involves substantial benefits and advantages for child-rearing
and for the welfare of children.96 Further explanation of reasons why a strong (but
qualified) dual-gendered, marital presumption should be continued are provided in
Part 11, Subsections D and E.
II. FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN PARENTAGE LAW: IS LOVE ALL You NEED?
One of the core conceptual issues that divides the proposals and comments pub-
lished in this Parentage Symposium is whether "substance" really is independent of and
separate from "form" in parentage law and whether "love is all you need" in parenting
and parentage law today. The suggestions in several of the Parentage Symposium
papers that would reduce or eliminate the significance of marital and biological con-
nections and of dual-gender parenting for parentage determinations all emphasize
"substance" and devalue traditional forms of parentage (that emphasize or prefer
marital, genetic, or biological relationships and male-female child-rearing). All also
argue that courts (and/or mothers) are better-suited to select good parenting by persons
who will further child well-being than reliance on these traditional relationship or
parenting forms.
The thesis of this Article is that form and substance are intertwined in parenting,
which should be reflected in parentage law. Specifically, marital parenting by a child's
mother and father (ideally the biological parents of the child) should be privileged,
preferred, encouraged, and specially protected because it provides children with optimal
opportunities for healthy development and a happy childhood, and lays the best founda-
tion for personal freedom, individual success, and responsible adulthood. While quasi-
parental status and rights should be recognized for carefully-screened categories of
non-parents who satisfy high standards of commitment to and care of children, and
of parental support and collaboration, as explained in Part m1, the status and rights of
parentage should not be expanded beyond biological and marital dual-gender parentage.
A. The Meaning of Form and Substance in Parentage Law
The tension between form and substance in family law underlies many contempo-
rary family policy debates, as well as many of the family policy controversies that have
" See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the
Marital Presumption, 65 MD. L. REv. 246,247 (2006) (arguing for reinvigorating the marital
presumption of paternity because "[miarriage matters-and should continue to matter-in
allocating parental rights and responsibilities").
96 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurtur-
ing of Children?, 42 SAN DIEo L. REv. 847,857-64 (2005) (recent well-designed, definitive
studies confirm that children raised in marital homes do better on a host of child welfare factors
than children raised in non-marital homes).
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drawn attention during the past forty years. For purposes of this article, "form" refers
to the structure, composition, or organization of family relationships; generally, it
involves conforming to customary (legal) organizational patterns expected of certain
relationships. Usually, it entails compliance with external social and legal formalities
established for creating or ordering such relationships. "Substance," on the other hand,
refers to the essential nature or quality of which a thing consists; the core content
or basic elements. Generally, it refers to internal conditions or qualities that are deemed
to be the most important, intangible, motivating characteristics of a particular family
relationship. The basic dispute concerns whether "form" and "substance" in family
law are largely independent or whether substance is significantly related to form.97
The form vs. substance debate takes on a particular poignancy when it involves
parenting, parent-child relations, and the law. "Form" in this context primarily refers
to formal legal recognition of dual-gendered marital and biological relationships
conferring parental status, rights, and responsibilities. "Substance" generally refers
to the internal qualities that generally characterize healthy biological parent-child
relations because of the natural affection that exists between parents and offspring,
such as a strong loving bond and mutual trust, adult willingness to sacrifice personal
interests and welfare for the sake of the child, special sympathy for and understand-
ing of each other, and adult commitment of time and resources to teach, train, and
protect the child (and appropriate willingness of the child to be taught and to
obey).98 The form vs. substance debate in parentage law concerns such overlapping
controversial issues as whether any adult child-nurturing relationships besides dual-
gendered marital, biological parent-child relationships should be able to claim the
legal protections and rights (and duties) of parentage against or in addition to those
of the legal parents (and, if so, which ones); whether that legal protection should be
equivalent to protections afforded legal parents (and, if not, what, if any, protections
should be provided); and whether two (or more) persons of the same gender should
both have full, equal parental rights (and, if so, which persons-and where to draw
the line).
The form vs. substance debate influences contemporary discussion about how to
define, determine, and describe the legal significance of legal parentage. While marital
parenting by biological or adoptive parents has traditionally been preferred and
privileged, whereby the form raises a strong (and traditionally near-exclusive) legal
" It is doubtful that anyone today would seriously argue that form is wholly unrelated to
substance in family law; instead, the debate is whether the relationship is strong or weak, signifi-
cant or minimal, undervalued or overvalued, and whether or when the legal emphasis on form
is justified or unjustified.
98 See generally Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) ("It is rooted in the
common experience of mankind, which teaches that parent and child normally share a strong
attachment or bond for each other, that a natural parent will normally sacrifice personal interest
and welfare for the child's benefit, and that a natural parent is normally more sympathetic and
understanding and better able to win the confidence and love of the child than anyone else.").
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presumption of substance, advocates of giving priority to substance over form argue
that characteristics such as loving, nurturing, teaching, and socializing are the most
important elements of parenting. If those elements are present, that is what matters
most; the form of the relationship is and legally should be largely irrelevant.9 9 Their
theme song (taken from the Beatles) is "All you need is love.'
The preference for substance over form in parenting and parentage law is
certainly understandable today.'' Our newspapers, magazines, radio and television
news programs, and Internet media regularly report terrible stories of failure and
abuse, irresponsibility, dysfunction, and abandonment afflicting many formal
parent-child relationships. Many people have experienced or know close friends or
99 See, e.g., ARLENE SKOLNICK, EMBATTLED PARADISE: THE AMImcAN FAMILY IN AN AGE
OF UNCERTAINTY 212 (1991) ("If we care about children, we need to focus less on the form of
the families they live in and more on ways of supporting their well-being in all kinds of fami-
lies."); Baker, supra note 57, at 2-6; Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal
Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461,485 ("What then, does morality require? I suggest that
the most important moral requirement at stake here is that adults care and provide for children.
Morality does not require that those children be the adults' biological offspring, and, as we have
seen, law which bases parental rights and duties on biological relationship alone is not notably
effective at inducing responsible behavior."); Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parent-
age Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 433 (2005); Niccole
Kording, Nature v. Nurture: Children Left Fatherless and Family-Less When Nature Prevails in
Paternity Actions, 65 U. Prrr. L. REV. 811 (2004); Jenny Wald, Legitimate Parents: Construing
California's Uniform Parentage Act to Protect Children Born Into Nontraditional Families,
6 J. Cm. FAM. CHILD. & CTS. 139 (2005); see also STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER
WERE: AMERIcAN FAMIuES AND THE NOSTALGIATRAP 255-81 (1992) (advocating disregarding
form of families and recognizing those that have subjective substance of family relations);
JUDrrH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POST-
MODERN AGE 126-35 (1996) (arguing for recognition of lesbian and gay parents rights because
they manifest the substance of parenting). To this list could be added virtually all of the exten-
sive library of legal literature advocating the extension of parental rights to gay and lesbian part-
ners of biological parents. See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Married with Kids and Moving: Achiev-
ing RecognitionforSame-Sex Parents Under the Uniform Parentage Act, 4 WHTIERJ. CHILD.
& FAM. ADvoc. 241 (2005); Jacobs, supra; Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian and Gay Parenting:
The Last Thirty Years, 66 MONT. L. REV. 51 (2005); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459, 473 (1990); Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-
Centered Critique of Genetic Parenthood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 591 (2006); Richard F.
Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status
Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006).
100 THE BEATLEs,All You Need Is Love (Capital Records 1967); see also 175 Songs of the
Beatles, http://membres.lycos.fr/Wilane/btls.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2006). See generally
Lynn D. Wardle, All You Need Is Love?, 14 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 51 (2004).
... See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Form and Substance in Committed Relationships in
American Law, in COMMITTED RELATIONSHIPS, SOCIETY AND THE LAW (Oran Doyle &
William Binchy eds., forthcoming 2007).
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family who have been hurt by the pain of failed or dysfunctional formal parents, so
the rejection of exclusive protection or privileged treatment of formal parenting is
a natural reaction to those reports, experiences, and fears. Form without substance
is doubly destructive. A child denied affection, protection, and training because he
or she is without any parents (an orphan) is deprived of something crucial indeed.
Yet, a child who is denied affection, protection, or education or who is injured by neg-
lectful or abusive parents suffers that as well as the additional loss of trust and is
damaged by the failure of one of the basic expectations of humanity.
The idea that parenthood should be linked to marriage seems to be rejected by
a growing number of alienated young people--children of the first generation of no-
fault divorces, many of whom experienced during their childhood the painful disintegra-
tion of their "formal" marital families during and after the no-fault divorce revolution
when the numbers and rates of divorce dramatically increased. 1"2 More than 30 million
of these childhood victims of no-fault divorce live in America now.'03 Many are now
adults, hoping to start their own families. Their distrust of the institution of marriage-
which failed them and hurt them deeply when they were children-is not insignificant.
Many of this generation of now-adult children of no-fault divorce are seeking
alternatives to marriage and demanding the chance to become parents on their own
terms--out of marriage. They are determined to be better parents out of marriage than
their own parents were in marriages that failed and hurt them so badly. Sadly, however,
the odds are against them, and many of these young people already have inflicted, are
inflicting, and will inflict on their own children the same kind of pain and sorrow their
own parents inflicted on them because they are building their own family relationships
on the same tragically flawed foundation that was the chief defect of their own parents'
marriages-a pursuit of superficial "substance" at the cost of deep-substance linked to
"form." Many of their parents devalued the institution of marriage when problems
arose by choosing to end the marriage and pursue the shallow "substance" of romantic
satisfaction rather than undertaking the tough work of overcoming and resolving
those problems and preserving the "deep substance" found within trial-strengthened
102 Between 1965 and 1980, the United States rate of divorce more than doubled, going
from 2.5 to 5.2 per 1,000 population, and the number of divorces per year similarly rose two-
and-a-half times, from 479,000 to 1,189,000. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., 3 VrrAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1988:
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 2, at 1 (1996). The percentage of the population that was
divorced rose from 2.9% to 6.2% (today it is nearly ten percent). U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS: 2000, at 3 (2003). Today, the number of divorced
persons in America reaches nearly twenty million (18.3 million in 1996). Arlene F. Saluter
& Terry A. Lugaila, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1996 (U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU 1998).
'03 Dave Schultheis, Colorado State Representative, Q&A on 2002 Children of Divorce
Protection Act, http://www.daveschultheis.com/CURRENTISSUES/FamilyMarriageand
Sexuality/QAon2002ChildrenofDivorceProtectionAct/Index.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
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marriages. It is no wonder that the children of those parents also devalue marriage-
and are skeptical of marriage's claim to be a unique form of relationship that provides
special protection and benefits for children.
Additionally, romanticized messages about the nobility and functional equi-
valence (if not superiority) of nonformal-but-loving-and-nurturing parental relation-
ships are common themes in the stories we tell ourselves (in movies, television
shows, theater, literature, song, etc.). Support for basing legal rights and decisions
on the substance rather than the form of such relationships resonates with the yearning
for privacy, independence, and autonomy that is deeply ingrained in the American
character. In a time when formal government regulation of so many aspects of our
individual and social lives is so pervasive, preference for private substance over
public-regulated form in parenting is very appealing. Protection for parental rights
and parental autonomy, including the rights of non-conforming parents, is deeply
imbedded in our constitutional doctrine.'°
Thus, it is not surprising that in recent years, there has been an increasing number
of cases challenging existing form-dependent regulations of parentage. There seems
to be a trend toward asserting parentage or parental rights claims based on the alleged
substance rather than the form of the relationship.10 5
B. The Elusiveness of "Substance" in Parentage Proceedings
Form is used as a substitute for substance in many ways in parentage decisions.
Parentage depends largely on the establishment of a legal or physiological form of
relationship. Conjugal marriage for centuries (if not millenia) has been the key legal
104 See infra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
0 Such claims include: claims to establish parentage out of wedlock; claims by a non-
marital partner to establish parentage of a child born to a married woman; claims by men to
disestablish parentage regarding a child after a paternity order or divorce decree with child
support obligations has been entered; claims by a mother to disestablish her husband's parentage
of a child born when the woman was married (often asserted to block a claim or exercise of
custody or visitation); claims by biologically unrelated gay or lesbian partners to be recog-
nized as the co-parent (usually by adoption) of a child born to their partner before the gay or
lesbian relationship began but raised for some period of time by both partners; claims by
biologically unrelated gay or lesbian partners to be recognized as the co-parent (usually by
adoption) of a child born to their partner during the gay or lesbian relationship (usually delib-
erately conceived by artificial reproductive technology and planned to be raised as the child
of both partners); claims by biologically related adults (as the lesbian partner egg-donor whose
egg was implanted in the other lesbian partner who gave birth to the child, or a sperm donor
gay man whose sperm inseminated a married woman who agreed to bear a child for him);
claims by biologically unrelated heterosexual and homosexual cohabitants or former cohabi-
tants of a child's parent to parental or quasi-parental rights and responsibilities (such as custody
and visitation); and claims by other unrelated or distant relatives who have had some associa-
tion with a child to full or partial parental rights, including custody or visitation.
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form of relationship linked to parentage status, at least for men."° Biological linkage
to a child is the key physiological form of relationship linked to parentage status for
most women, and recently for many men, as well. Because the world is filled with
examples of marital and biological parents who have lacked the substance of good
parents, many critics and litigants have argued that parentage determination should
be based directly upon substance of good parenting, rather than form.07
Basing legal parentage decisions on substance would be more difficult than may
have been imagined and potentially much more problematic than relying primarily
on form. As a legal criterion for parentage decisions, substance (good parenting) is very
elusive. For example, defining the substance of parentage that should be legally opera-
tive is no less complicated than defining the form of parentage. There is no consensus
or authoritative standard regarding what specific elements are deemed of greatest or
essential value, nor is the exact statement, formulation, or definition of those elements
clear. Do we really want the government to develop a list of the approved substance
of parentage? Yet if the elements of parentage-creating substance are to be applied
uniformly by courts, they must not be arbitrary or vague.
When standards are ambiguous, judicial discretion is at its greatest. To make deci-
sions as important as parentage decisions based on subjective judicial discretion,
variable from one judge to another and potentially influenced by a plethora of personal
preferences or prejudices, is deeply troubling. Likewise, proof of parental substance
may be quite difficult to establish inasmuch as it entails intangibles. When proof is
difficult, the advantage generally goes to the party with greater resources to dig out
the evidence or pay experts to generate it. If substance of the relationship were disposi-
tive of parentage disputes, the proof requirement would make such proceedings even
more wealth-favoring than in most other kinds of legal cases (where the ability to
hire better attorneys seems to favor the richer party). The idea that parentage determina-
tions would become contests in which the richest contestants win is also very disturbing.
Timing presents a problem for advocates of substance-based parentage decisions.
Many agree that it is in the best interests of children to establish parentage at the time
of the birth of a child or as soon as possible thereafter.0 8 For the parentage claimant or
'06 Should it not be for women as well? Given the importance of fathering, and the special
advantages of biological fathers for the maturation and development of children, perhaps
marriage should become a more significant factor in establishing parentage for women.
107 See infra Part III.
10 JOSEPH GOLDsTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53 (1979)
("The least detrimental alternative... is that specific placement and procedure... which
maximizes, in accord with the child's sense of time and on the basis of short-term predictions
given the limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity for being wanted and for
maintaining on a continuous basis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become
his psychological parent."); id. at 50-51 (a child's sense of time makes children highly sensitive
to the length of separations). See generally Martin Guggenheim & Christine Gottlieb, Justice
Denied: Delays in Resolving Child Protection Cases in New York, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
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claimants of a first-born child, providing evidence that they possess the substance
of a good parent might be hard to prove."
Making substance the test for parentage might give an advantage to older claimants
and claimants with one or more children over younger persons claiming parentage
(including biological parents). It might advantage grandparents over parents. It could
disadvantage older persons whose first child or children had not behaved well. It
could disadvantage persons who had been marginal parents in the past but whose
attitude and commitment had matured (it might be difficult for them to prove those
intangible improvements in the face of evidence of their past inferior behavior).
Moreover, parentage is based on a prediction about the quality of future parenting.
Even if we could arrive at a strong social consensus about the qualities that make up
the substance of good parenting, how to describe them, and what proof would manifest
those intangible elements, we would lack a completely reliable test for predicting the
existence of those qualities in the future. Parentage status is not a reward for past
behavior. Even adults who have been very good parents in the past (i.e., providing
the substance of sacrificial love, commitment, protection, and training) may fail to
provide the substance of good parenting in the future to other children who have
different personalities or because of different environmental circumstances (e.g.,
loss of job, loss of property, loss of health, loss of spouse, loss of extended family
support, change of spouse, change of geographic location, war, etc.).
Ultimately, the libertarian-privacy values that drive the preference for substance
over form in parentage law would be among the first and most severely damaged
victims if that law reform were adopted. Legal inquiry into the substance of parenting
would entail massive intrusion into family and parental privacy. The substitution
of subjective substantive standards for objective standards based on form would
endanger unpopular minorities who would be at the mercy of the discretion of
judges. The test of form shields individual privacy and protects the right to individual-
ism, the right to be different, and the right to experiment with different, new, or un-
conventional parenting styles.
C. Form as Substance in Parenting and Parentage Law
Problems with using substance to make parentage decisions may explain why the
law has generally looked to the substance of parenting only in exceptional situations.
546 (2005) (advocating respect for a child's sense of time in child protection cases); Alexandra
Dylan Lowe, Parents and Strangers: The Uniform Adoption Act Revisits the Parental Rights
Doctrine, 30 FAM. L.Q. 379, 411 n.139 (noting child's sense of time recommendation of
Goldstein et al.).
'09 The mother might be able to show that she behaved responsibly in the child's interests
during her pregnancy. Fathers might show evidence of commitment and willingness to
provide for the child. Both could show emotional attachment or anticipation. Those, however,
would cover only a small part of the substance of good parenting.
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For example, courts have looked directly at parental substance for the purpose of polic-
ing and enforcing the minimum level of acceptable parenting substance. Out of ne-
cessity, the law has identified minimum standards of substance. "' There appears to be
social consensus about some kinds of unacceptable parental behavior-abuse or neglect.
However, even in termination of parental rights proceedings, the focus is often on the
negative parenting (bad parenting and actual harm, such as physical or sexual abuse,
medical or education deprivation, etc.), rather than on the presence of good parenting
substance. Thus, there may be some social consensus about what constitutes really
bad, intolerable parenting. There even may be some social consensus about what
constitutes really extraordinary, heroic parenting. "' But in the middle between the
two extremes, courts tend to avoid making substance-based decisions for all of the
reasons indicated above."2
Thus, parentage law and courts have utilized form (both legal form, especially
marriage, and biological form of relationship) as a substitute for substance. Certain
forms are presumed to raise a presumption of substance usually rebuttable only on
proof that a party has fallen below the minimum-tolerable level of parenting.
Focusing primarily on form preserves and reinforces parentage as an institution.
There are no formless institutions; forms of institutions are part of their presence
and identity. To level all forms of parent-child relationship by making them equal in
110 Even in this context, there are frequent controversies when state agents and agencies
charged with protecting children try to "push" the minimum standard a little and seek to termi-
nate parental rights on grounds that provoke a public backlash. For example, two years ago in
Utah, the state child protection agency and guardian-ad-litem tried to remove a teenage boy,
Parker Jensen, from his middle-class parents' custody because the parents (and the boy) refused
to submit to chemotherapy for a condition that the boy's doctor believed the child had, but was
not absolutely certain. The parents fought back in the press, provoking a firestorm of public
outcry. A few months later, when the legislature re-convened, more than forty bills were intro-
duced to reduce the power of the state agencies involved. See, e.g., David B. Dibble, Parental
Rights Movement on Utah's Capitol Hill Should Not Make Gains at the Expense of the
State's Children, 2005 BYU Educ. & L.J. 1 (reviewing case, public reaction, legislation, and
commentary); Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 215,359-65 (describing
the Parker Jensen case and subsequent legislative proposals); Recent Developments in Utah
Law, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1430, 1431-37 (also describing the Parker Jensen case and sub-
sequent legislative proposals).
.' The standard for adoption historically has tried to identify parents with exceptional,
gold-standard, near-heroic parental qualities.
12 The best example is in custody disputes upon divorce. The common (near-ubiquitous)
standard once was "best interests of the child," and that or similar language still appears in many
custody statutes and cases. Even this standard focuses on the child's needs, not the parents'
parenting substance. Today, it is rare to find a custody case in which a court declares that one
parent is a better parent (has better parental substance) than the other parent. Rather, courts
turn to experts about child needs and development and relate that child's particular needs to
the situation of a particular parent. Usually the court finds that "both parents are fit" parents but
that one is better situated to provide for the needs of the particular child or children.
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the law, by piercing the form, and by focusing instead on substance destroys institutional
influence. By making the form of parentage invisible, the institution of parentage also
becomes invisible. As institutions such as marriage and parentage wither and deterio-
rate, the social influence they exert on members of society, especially on the young,
also weakens and wanes. As the informal, non-legal influence of social institutions
weakens, the need for government to exert its influence increases. Thus, ironically,
as the law moves from making form primarily determinative of parentage to focusing
on internal substance, it undermines the ability of the institution of parentage to
perform valuable social channeling and regulating functions through informal
means, and increases the need for the state to exert its power over individuals and
families through more coercive and-may we say-formal means." 3
Historically, parentage laws have relied primarily on relationship forms to establish
parentage. The principal legal form used to establish paternity is marriage. There are
many reasons why marriage has been the test for paternity. First, the overwhelming
majority of children born to married women are the biological offspring of their
mothers' husbands; that is even true in today's world of loosened sexual morality, weak
social support for marital integrity, diminished social opprobrium for adultery, and
increased rates of marital infidelity.'14 Second, the substance of good parentage (com-
mitment, care, protection, training, etc.) is generally associated with and often flows
from biological parentage (which is marital parentage in most cases), marital parentage
(even alone), and especially combined conjugal-marital-and-biological parentage. Third,
for most of history, there was no more accurate or reliable basis for determining actual
biological paternity in most cases than marriage. Fourth, even though DNA and other
scientific tissue or blood or other physiological tests are now able to identify parentage
with high rates of accuracy, the ease and simplicity of equating marital with biological
parentage is not an insignificant advantage. Scientific parentage testing involves some
bodily intrusion and even greater psychological intrusion into individual and family
privacy, and results may take days or weeks; whereas marriage is a public status which
parties voluntary assume and is easily ascertainable as a matter of public record.
13 These thoughts were stimulated by the very insightful analysis of Jennifer Roback
Morse, Marriage and the Limits of Contract, 130 POL'Y REV., Apr.-May 2005, available at
http://www.policyreview.org/apr05/morse.html.
"' See supra note 94 and accompanying text. A landmark 1994 National Opinion Research
Council (University of Chicago) survey revealed that slightly more than twenty-one percent
of married men and 12.5% of married women reported that they had engaged in extramarital
relations while married. TOM W. SMITH, AMERICAN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: TRENDS, SOCIO-
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES, AND RISK BEHAVIOR tbl.7 (National Opinion Research Center,
Univ. of Chicago, Updated Dec., 1998), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss/ (click Reports-
Topical Reports-Report 25) (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). When less-reliable-but-more-
sensational higher rates of adultery are cited, it is usually by writers seeking to justify or
legitimate adultery. See, e.g., Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime &
the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45, 55-56 (1991-92).
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It is important to remember that biological parentage is itself a matter of form as it
relates to the substance of good parenting. That is, if the goal and policy of the law is
to provide for every child, parents who are sacrificially committed to the welfare of
their children, care deeply and affectionately for them, and are fully devoted to protect-
ing them and providing them with optimal educational, social, physical, economic,
moral and spiritual development and independence (i.e., the substance of good parent-
ing), and actually bond with the child, a biological tie is only a formal (physical) connec-
tion that is associated with and a predictor of that kind of parenting. Yet, biological
parentage has been the underlying connecting link represented or assumed by the marital
paternity rule because, again, biological parentage is associated with the substance
of good parenting. Parents generally are biased toward, prefer, have "natural affection"
for, love and spoil their offspring, the fruit of their loins, their blood progeny who carry
their blood and genes and often look like them or their beloved relatives.
Biological connection itself may only be a "form" substituting for an assumed ge-
netic connection of "flesh and blood kin." Today, genetic and biological connection are
not necessarily synonymous. For example, the birth mother of a child conceived with an
egg donated by another woman may be presumed to be the mother of the child she bore,
even though the child is genetically unrelated to her. The examples of using one form of
relationship to substitute for other forms of relationship, which ultimately are them-
selves substitutes for desired substance qualities or characteristics, could be multiplied.
Each level of form associated with parentage presumptions in the law (e.g., genetic
connection, biological connection, marital connection) independently has qualities
that mightjustify linking it with the establishment of parentage apart from the other
forms. The benefits of each level of form are cumulative. Thus, marital parentage is
mostly the same as biological parentage, which is mostly the same as genetic parentage.
Marital parents who are also biological parents and genetic parents have multiple layers
of connection to the child that multiply the predictive likelihood that they will provide
the substance of good parenting that the law seeks to imbue in parenting.
Thus, form does not merely represent, substitute for, and raise a presumption of
the substance of good parenting. Certain forms of parenting actually engender, gen-
erate, reinforce, nurture, support, cultivate, and enhance the very substance of parent-
ing. The substance of good parenting thrives in some forms (e.g., marital parenting)
and struggles in many others (e.g., cohabitation and single-parenting). Form is sub-
stance not only because it is associated with substance, but because some forms (like
marital parenting) create and increase the substance of good parenting.
D. Does Marital Form Really Matter in Parenting?
The argument that there is a significant connection between form of parenting
(family structure) and substance of good parenting, as well as the historical legal
presumptions and preferences regarding determination of parentage and the proposals
made herein for establishing and regulating parentage, are predicated in significant
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part on the validity of the assumption that the form of marital parentage is significantly
and strongly associated with the substance of good parenting." 5 Invariably, the chal-
lenge is made to "prove" the truth of that connection. The demand for empirical
evidence may manifest the truth of Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous observation
that "we need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure.""' 6
Of course, what social scientists find will depend on what they are looking for, and
there is little doubt that social scientists are influenced by their value preferences,
peer pressure, and social taboos in their research." 7 Nonetheless, with armies of
social scientists and libraries of social science publications, it is not unreasonable
to expect that such connections could be identified and documented.
Whether that evidence would be collected may be another matter, as social
science research reflects the social and political preferences and prejudices of the
members of those disciplines."' In fact, the academic writing in this area clearly
"s I have reviewed many of the studies described here in prior publications. See generally
Lynn D. Wardle, Children and the Future of Marriage, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 279, 288-98
(2005) (reviewing studies showing benefits for children who grow up in traditional married
families); Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts on Children and Society of "Lesbigay"
Parenting, 23 QUINNIPiAc L. REV. 541,550-63 (2004) [hereinafter Wardle, Considering the
Impacts of Children] (reviewing flaws in research supportive of homosexual child rearing and
the benefits of marital parenting for children); Lynn D. Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish":
Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 788-92 (2001) [hereinafter Wardle, Multiply andReplenish] (review-
ing disadvantages faced by children raised in non-marital families); Lynn D. Wardle, Parent-
hood and the Limits of Adult Autonomy, 24 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 169, 186-89 (2005)
[hereinafter Wardle, Parenthood and the Limits] (reviewing the benefits of father-mother child
rearing); Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Para-
meters, 4 WHrIER J. CHLD & FAM. ADVOC. 323,324 (2005) [hereinafter Wardle, Parentless-
ness] (describing children who grow up with only one parent as "partially parentless"); Lynn
D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
833,846-64 [hereinafter Wardle, Potential Impact] (reviewing methodological problems with
studies on the effect of parental homosexual behavior and noting the data indicating the
importance of father-mother parenting); Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for Marital Couple
Adoption-Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 345, 377-80 (2003)
[hereinafter Wardle, PreferenceforMarital CoupleAdoption] (finding clear benefits for father-
mother parenting and critiquing studies finding no difference between father-mother child rear-
ing and homosexual child rearing); Lynn D. Wardle, Threats and Challenges to the Family
in the Twenty-first Century, in THE FAMILY: AT THE CENTER OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 41
(2001). Some of the descriptions and commentary herein repeat those prior reviews.
116 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 292-93 (1920).
117 See generally Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-
Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 18-23 (describing taboo against professional publi-
cations criticizing gay family relations and same-sex marriage in particular); Wardle, Potential
Impact, supra note 115, at 836-40 (1997) (describing heavy bias of academic and profes-
sional literature about child-rearing by gay and lesbian couples).
"1 See DESTRUCTIVE TRENDS IN MENTAL HEALTH: THE WELL-INTENTIONED PATH TO
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reflects some significant taboos regarding parenting styles (as regarding lesbigay
parenting)." 9 There are significant problems in the collection of data about an
alternative parenting style that may reflect poorly on the form of parenting. There
are many different forms, structures, and styles of parenting. There are many other
variables that must be identified, examined, and controlled when studying parenting
styles (such as age of children, number of children, socio-economic status, education,
timing of various events, transitions, disruptions, and stability). Methodological flaws
can impair the reliability and validity of the data; analytical flaws may undermine the
use of the data; interpretative bias can influence presentation of conclusions.
Despite these obstacles, the evidence is clear: "[t]he notion that all 'family forms'
are equally as helpful or healthful for children has no basis in science."'2 Perhaps no
further support need be offered than the very carefully selected and scrutinized studies
described by Professors Wilcox and Wilson.' Wilcox and Wilson conclude that,
generally, "children do best in a married home, compared to the alternatives."' 22
It bears emphasizing, however, that an impressive body of empirical research
strongly supports the immense value of conjugal-marital child-rearing. '23 Tak-
ing a macro-perspective of the accumulating data (rather than a precise metho-
dological examination of each quantitative study), it appears that the evidence
is simply overwhelming and growing,'24 but still very unpopular in many
HARM (Rogers H. Wright & Nicholas A. Cummings eds., 2005) (criticizing psychological
and psychiatric scholarship and professional developments as manifesting priority given to
political agendas over objective and open scholarly inquiry); Richard E. Redding, Sociopolitical
Diversity in Psychology: The Case for Pluralism, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 205, 207 (2001)
(describing the lack of conservatives in the social sciences and the resulting unintended
negative consequences).
" See Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 115, at 836-40 (describing huge imbalance
in law review articles about lesbigay parenting); Redding, supra note 118, at 207.
"o A. Dean Byrd, Gender Complementarity and Child-Rearing: Where Tradition and
Science Agree, 6 J.L. & FAM. STuD. 213, 213 (2004).
1 Wilcox & Wilson, supra note 37, at 891-904.
122 Id. at 883; see also Wilson, supra note 96, at 857-64 (reviewing in detail two definitive
studies that show children raised in marital homes do better in many areas than children raised
in non-marital homes).
123 See supra note 115 for a list of the author's prior publications reviewing the social
science evidence.
124 For some accessible compilations of the existing research, see, for example, PAUL R.
AMATO & ALAN BooTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UP-
HEAVALpassim (1997); DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR
MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 1-5, 25-48 (1995); GENERATIVE FATHERING: BEYOND
DEFICrTPERSPEcTIvESpassim (Alan J. Hawkins & David C. Dollahite eds., 1997); ELIZABETH
MARQUARDT, BETWEEN Two WORLDS: THE INNER LIVES OF CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 9-12,
16 (2005); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 19-63, 134 (1994); DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER:
COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR
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circles.'25 As Rutgers Professor David Popenoe has noted, there are few bodies of
social science research where the evidence is so abundant or so clear in showing that
homes with a father and mother provide the best environment for raising emotionally
stable children.126 Psychologist and Professor A. Dean Byrd is even more specific in
his review of the evidence: "There is no fact that has been established by social science
literature more convincingly than the following: all variables considered, children are
best served when reared in a home with a married mother and father."' 27 He adds:
Children [raised by their married mother and father] navigate devel-
opmental stages more easily, are more solid in their gender identity,
perform better in academic tasks at school, have fewer emotional
disorders and become better functioning adults when they are reared
by dual-gender parents. This conclusion, supported further by a ple-
thora of research spanning decades, clearly demonstrates gender-
linked differences in child-rearing that are protective for children. 
21
Likewise, former Brigham Young University Law School Dean Bruce C. Hafen has
noted that "[tihe most important causal factor of [recent declines in American] child
THEGOOD OFCHILDREN AND SOCIETY 52-73 (1996); THE POSTDIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN,
PARENTING, AND SoCiETY passim (Ross A. Thompson & Paul R. Amato eds., 1999); GLENN
T. STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE MATrERS: REASONS TO BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN
SOCIETY 97-122 (1997) (summarizing studies showing disadvantages of single parenting);
LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE
ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); JUDITH WALLERSTEIN &
SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER
DIVORCE passim (1989) (describing the negative long-term impact of divorce); JUDITH
WALLERSTEIN ET AL, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY
107, 297, 299-300 (2000) (discussing the long-term effects of divorce and scholarly consensus
regarding certain harms caused by divorce); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE
CULTURE 91-106 (1997); see also INST. FOR AM. VALUES, WHY MARRIAGE MATrERS:
TWENTY-ONE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2002); INST. FOR AM. VALUES,
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-SIX CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 8-9 (2005)
[hereinafter TwENTY-SIx CONCLUSIONS]; INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MARRIAGE FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS: A COMPREHENSIVE LITERATURE REVIEW (2005); CTR.
FOR MARRIAGE & FAMILIES, FAMILY STRUCTURE AND CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES
2-4 (2005), http://www.americanvalues.org/briefs/edoutcomes.htm.
125 Larry D. Barnett, Opinion and Knowledge of Child-Rearing Professionals and Non-
Professionals Regarding Three Child-Rearing Systems, 15 FAM. LIFE CooRDINATOR 101 (1966).
126 David Popenoe, Editorial, The Controversial Trust: Two-Parent Families Are Better,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1992, at 21 ("[S]ocial science research is almost never conclusive...
[y]et in three decades of work as a social scientist, I know of few other bodies of data in
which the weight of evidence is so decisively on one side of the issue: on the whole, for
children, two-parent families are preferable to single-parent families and stepfamilies.").
127 Byrd, supra note 120, at 214.
128 Id.
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well-being is the remarkable collapse of marriage, leading to growing family instability
and decreasing parental investment in children."' 29 University of Chicago demo-
grapher Linda Waite has written: "On average, children of married parents are physi-
cally and mentally healthier, better educated, and later in life, enjoy more career
success than children in other family settings. Children with married parents are
also more likely to escape some of the more common disasters of late-twentieth-
century childhood and adolescence."' 130
By comparison, children of divorce or without fathers in their home are at the
greatest risk of crime, child abuse, premarital sex, premarital pregnancy, poverty, and
lower education, perform more poorly in school, and achieve less career success.13'
"Compared with children with continuously married parents, children with divorced
parents continued to score significantly lower on measures of academic achievement,
conduct, psychological adjustment, self-concept, and social relations."' 32 Children of
broken marriages "must cope with new emotional and logistical difficulties" and they
invariably miss living with the absent parent, whether father or mother; a growing body
of research shows that for many children, "the suffering continues for years. For
some, it never ends."' 1
33
What explains the tremendous advantages for children raised by their married
mother and father? No one theory explains all of the research, and it is likely that a
combination of these theories may explain why marital parenting works best. The
theories include childhood socialization-children who grow up without a father are
socialized in a way that results in disadvantages for living in a dual-gender society;1M
social control-supervision of children is more difficult in a single-parent household;131
instability-dangerous behaviors are a response to the stress of instability and change
in a child's situation; 36 greater resources-more adult caregiver-mentors and more
129 Bruce C. Hafen, Bridle Your Passions: How Modem Law Can Protect the Family, 63
VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 635 (1997) (alteration in original).
130 WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 124, at 124; see also Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage
Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 497-98 (1995).
131 WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 124, at 124-40; see also E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON
& JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 208 (2002);
WALLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 328-32.
132 Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato and Keith
(1991) Meta-Analysis, 15 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 355 (2001).
133 INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 3,
10-12 (2000) [hereinafter MARRIAGE MOVEMENT].
'34 Lawrence L. Wu & Brian C. Martinson, Family Structure and the Risk of a Premarital
Birth, 58 Am. SOC. REV. 210,210 (1993) (supporting conflict theory and childhood socializa-
tion theory but not social control theory to explain why teens of married parents have fewer
pregnancies out of wedlock).
135 Id.
136 Id.; see also Paul R. Amato et al., Parental Divorce, Marital Conflict, and Offspring
Well-being During Early Adulthood, 73 SOCIAL FORCES 895 (1995).
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assets provide greater opportunity for children;'37 greater attachment-more closeness
between children and parents insulates children; 3 ' experience with a child or children
generally;' 39 pre-existing interest, or selection-biological attachment engenders natural
affection that singles out children for favor and favorable responses. ° Thus, the studies
need to be carefully controlled to account for background factors that may be indepen-
dent of the form of parenting. Also, comparing conjugal marital and nonmarital parent-
ing may be of some help, but the kinds of nonmarital parenting need to be distinguished
between children born out of wedlock and raised by a single parent (with little or no
involvement of the father), children of divorced or separated parents, children raised by
heterosexual cohabiting parents (or a biological parent and his or her opposite-sex
nonmarital partner(s)), children raised by gay and lesbian parents (these parents can
be further distinguished by whether the child was conceived/born after the lesbigay
union, from a prior union of one of the parties, etc.), children raised in reconstituted
(step-) families, and children raised by relatives from their extended family (with
or without parental involvement of a biological parent).
Marriage is a powerful social institution that is designed to link sexual activity
and procreation to child-rearing.' 4' Human intimacy and procreation involves powerful
"' Yongmin Sun, The Well-Being ofAdolescents in Households With No Biological Parents,
65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 894 (2003) (finding that some differences between non-biological-
parent and other family structures may be accounted for by differences in family resources).
138 Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-Being in Cohabiting, Mar-
ried, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 891 (2003) (finding that
closeness of teen's relationship to his/her parents is a better predictor of well-being than parental
monitoring; findings indicate attachment rather than social control theories of child develop-
ment; religious teens are more likely to do better than non-religious teens); see also Paul R.
Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children's Well-Being: A Meta-Analysis,
61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557 (1999) (finding that children do better when a nonresident father
is close to a child and authoritatively participates in parenting).
139 Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads Equal? Biology Versus Mar-
riage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213, 229-30 (2003)
(examining three theories why children growing up in a household in which a man other than
their biological father married to their mother are worse off: (1) the non-biological father or
biological cohabiting father will be less involved (more interested in his relationships with their
mother); (2) they lack the experience with children or child to be effective fathers; and (3)
selectivity-men who choose to enter such a relationship are selected because of a lack of alter-
natives). Married biological fathers are more likely to be more involved with a child than a
cohabiting biological father.
40 Id. at 214-15.
' "Because human childhood dependency is long-lasting (legally presumed to last eighteen
years) and labor intensive, the social consequences of procreation are substantial." See Wardle,
Multiply and Replenish, supra note 115, at 783. Society has a profound interest "to ensure
that persons whose sexual behavior has resulted in the procreation of human children accept
and fulfill the responsibility of parenting the children they have generated." Id.
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passions of sexual and biological relationships. 4 2 Instability in those relationships
involving a sexual partner or offspring have historically generated much interpersonal
hostility and conflict. Children are the first victims of such confusion, instability, and
domestic violence. 143
Children living outside of intact marital families are much more likely to be victims
of child abuse than children in intact marital families. For example, children without
fathers are more likely to be victims of physical and sexual abuse than children in
intact marital families.44 Nearly seventy percent of children live with two parents,
but those children account for only twenty-eight percent of the child abuse; whereas
twenty-five percent of children live with single mothers, and those children account
for forty-four percent of the abused children population.'45 Single mothers' boyfriends
perform less than two percent of child care, but they are "responsible for about half
the child abuse committed by nonparents in caregiving roles."'"
The increased experience with child abuse may be one reason why many surveys
show that children living apart from their fathers are far more likely than other children
to experience social adjustment problems, to be expelled or suspended from school, to
display emotional and behavioral problems, to have difficulty getting along with their
peers, and to get in trouble with the police. 47 Children living apart from their fathers
'"ave more social adjustment problems.""' Dr. Urie Bronfenbrenner reported that even
after controlling for such factors as low income, "children growing up in [single-
parent] households are at a greater risk for experiencing a variety of behavioral and edu-
cational problems, including... smoking, drinking, [and] early and frequent sexual
142 See generally WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 35-36
(1968) ("[S]ex is a river of fire that must be banked and cooled by a hundred restraints if it
is not to consume in chaos both the individual and the group.").
143 See generally Amato et al., supra note 136. The value of marriage to enhance stability
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court more than a century ago.
[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and neces-
sary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth ... than
that which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as
consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one
woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that
is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent
morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and
political improvement.
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
144 BLANKENHORN, supra note 124, at 39-42.
141 Catherine M. Malkin & Michael E. Lamb, Child Maltreatment: A Test of Sociobio-
logical Theory, 25 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 121, 129 (1994).
'46 Leslie Margolin, Child Abuse by Mothers' Boyfriends: Why the Overrepresentation?,
16 CHIID ABUSE & NEGLECT 541, 545 (1992) (The study focused on Iowa, and I feel those
results can be true on a larger scale.).
147 See Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 115, at 848.
148 Id.
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experience."' 49 In many ways "[c]hildren in one-parent families are much worse off
than those in two-parent families even when both families have the same earnings."'
150
While background factors including income are dominant factors, recent research con-
firms that "children raised in stable, cohabiting-parent families [which other data
shows are uncommon] exhibit more behavior problems at age three than children
raised in stable, married-parent families [which are more common]."'' Even taking into
account socio-economic status, children raised in intact marital families enjoy better
physical health than children raised in all other family forms.'52 Children being raised
by single parents are at heightened risk for "hyperactivity or withdrawal ... difficulty
in deferring gratification,. . . school misbehavior, [and] absenteeism."' Parental di-
vorce doubles the risk that children will themselves divorce.'54 Parental divorce is
associated with many emotional problems, problems with self-esteem, and difficulties
with social relationships.'55 Children of marital families report significantly better rela-
tionships with their fathers (twenty-nine percent of non-divorced children rating that
relationship as "poor" compared to sixty-five percent of children of divorce).'56
Children in single-parent families exhibit higher teen-childbirth rates5-three times
higher than children whose parents stayed married according to one recent study. 5
Only ten percent of teens aged twelve to fourteen living in intact families have engaged
in sex, while the rates are twenty percent for those living in blended families, twenty-
three percent in mother-headed families, and twenty-seven percent in father-only
families. 59 Children growing up in single-parent households are at a significantly
increased risk for drug abuse as teenagers. " "[T]he importance of family structure
"' Urie Bronfenbrenner, Discovering What Families Can Do, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A
NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY 27, 34 (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990).
'5o James Q. Wilson, Human Remedies for Social Disorders, 131 PUB. INT. 25,27-28 (1998).
'"I FRAGILE FAMILIES & CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, YOUNG CHILDREN'S BEHAVIORAL
PROBLEMS IN MARRIED AND COHABrrATING FAMILIEs 3 (2005), http://www.fragilefamilies.
princeton.edu/briefs/ResearchBrief33.pdf.
152 TWENTY-SIX CONCLUSIONS, supra note 124, at 23.
153 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 149, at 34.
1'A TWENTY-Six CONCLUSIONS, supra note 124, at 14.
'I FRANK F. FURSTENBURG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLjN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS
TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 65-70 (1991); Paul R. Amato, Children's Adjustment to
Divorce: Theories, Hypotheses, and Empirical Support, 55 J. MARRIAGE&FAM. 23,23 (1993).
156 TWENTY-SIX CONCLUSIONS, supra note 124, at 12.
'5 See id. at 17-18.
158 MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 133, at 11 (citing Andrew J. Cherlin etal., Parental
Divorce in Childhood and Demographic Outcomes in Young Adulthood, 32 DEMOGRAPHY
299, 310-11 (1995)).
19 Id. at 12 (citing Robert L. Filewelling & Karl E. Bauman, Family Structure asa Predictor
of Initial Substance Use and Sexual Intercourse in Early Adolescence, 52 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 171, 171 (1990)).
"6 Rhonda E. Denton & Charlene M. Kampfe, The Relationship Between Family Variables
and Adolescent Substance Abuse: A Literature Review, 114 ADOLESCENCE 475 (1994).
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variables" in predicting early sexual intercourse is "striking.." 6' The risks of early
sexual activity are seventy-seven percent higher for boys and fifty-six percent higher for
girls living in step-families, and sixty-two percent higher for boys and fifty-three percent
higher for girls living in single-parent and non-parent family structures as compared to
children raised by their biological parents. 62
A recent study suggests that being raised with a mother in the home protects teens
from anxiety and depression (internal concerns), while having a father involved in child-
rearing protects against such matters as impulsivity, hyperactivity, aggression, and delin-
quency (external coping factors), especially for daughters; for total "behavioral problems"
only the presence of fathers (not mothers) in the home was a significant variable. 63
Studies in Europe corroborate the conclusion that "[flamily structure [is] clearly
associated with" multiple risk factors for adolescents."
[Elven after controlling for their generally better material circum-
stances, young people living with both birth parents at fifteen were,
three years later, less likely than those from 'step' and/or lone
parent households to be heavy drinkers, have experience of drugs,
of heterosexual intercourse, no school qualifications, to be unem-
ployed or, among young women, to have experienced pregnancy. 165
Likewise, an Australian study reported highest socialization and adjustment skills (in
class and on the playground) for children raised by married parents, over children
raised by cohabiting parents and lesbigay parents."
A recent report noted that
[o]ne quarter of children in both mother-only and remarried fami-
lies repeat a grade in school, compared to 14 percent of those in
married families. About a quarter of children in mother-only fami-
161 Kathleen Mullan Harris et al., Evaluating the Role of "Nothing to Lose" Attitudes on
Risky Behavior in Adolescence, 80 Soc. FORCES 1005, 1032 (2002), discussed at http://www
.profam.org/pub/nr/nr_ 1606.htm?search=family%20structure.
162 Id. at 1023-28.
163 Susan K. Williams & F. Donald Kelly, Relationships Among Involvement, Attachment,
and Behavioral Problems in Adolescence: Examining Father's Influence, 25 J. EARLY
ADOLESCENCE 168 (2005), discussed at http:llwww.profam.org/pub/nr/nr_ 91 1.htm?search=
comparison%20parenting&opt=ALL.
"6 Helen Sweeting et al., Teenage Family Life, Lifestyles and Live Chances: Associations
with Family Structure, Conflict with Parents and Joint Family Activity, 12 INT'L J.L. POL'Y
& FAM. 15, 38 (1998) (family time and conflict with parents account for some of the difference
for some of the factors, but those are also associated with family structure).
165 id.
'66 Sotirios Sarantakos, Children in Three Contexts: Family, Education and Social
Development, 21 CHILDREN AUsTRALIA 23 (1996).
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lies (and 18 percent in stepfamilies) have been suspended or ex-
pelled, compared to less than 10 percent in mother-father families. 67
Children in a single-parent family generally "perform less successfully in educational
activities, [and] have more social adjustment problems.""' Children raised with two
parents have much higher rates of academic achievement, are up to one-third less
likely to quit high school, and up to two-thirds less likely to drop out of college as
children raised in other family structures.'69 Comparing high school students from
different family structures, a 2003 survey that controlled for other significant
variables (i.e., gender, ethnicity, family size, mother's education, father's education,
and age at time of divorce) found that students from intact, married mother-father
families outperformed students from non-intact family structures in terms of grades
and attendance. 7 ' Likewise, "students from disrupted families [are] less likely to
apply to, be admitted to, attend, or ever attend a four-year college. They were also
less likely to choose a selective college."'' Indeed, it appears that family structure
is a critical element in shaping children's IQ, and that "family environment plays
a key and possibly irreversible role in shaping a child's intelligence."' 172 A study of
school performance and behavior of hundreds of children being raised by married,
cohabiting, and homosexual parents in Australia found that in almost all areas (includ-
ing language and math exams, sports, learning, parental support, and aspirations for
their children's education), children raised by married parents did the best, followed
by cohabiting heterosexual parents, followed by lesbigay parents. '" Thus, one wonders
whether changing family structure (fewer married parents) might be related to the
March 2006 ACT, Inc. report, which found that "[o]nly 51 percent of last year's
high-school graduates who took the ACT examination had the reading skills they
167 MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 133, at 12 (citing Nicholas Zill, Understanding
Why Children in Stepfamilies Have More Learning and Behavior Problems Than Children
in Nuclear Families, in STEPFAM.IF_ : WHO BENEFrrs? WHO DoEs NOT? 97-106 (Alan
Booth & Judy Dunn eds., 1994)).
168 Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 115, at 18. See generally Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47,66 (asserting that
a growing body of social-scientific evidence demonstrates that children raised in single-parent
families are worse off than children in two-parent families in many areas of well-being).
169 Whitehead, supra note 168, at 66.
170 Barry D. Ham, The Effects of Divorce on the Academic Achievement of High School Se-
niors, 38 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 167, 167 (2003); id. at 176-81 (statistics show that chil-
dren from intact families perform better in all categories than children from divorced families).
'' Dean Lillard & Jennifer Gerner, Getting to the Ivy League: How Family Composition
Affects College Choice, 70 J. HIGHER EDUC. 706, 721 (1999).
172 DAVIDJ. ARMOR, MAXIMIZING INTELLIGENCE, at ix (2003); see also id. at 92-98, 184-89.
173 Sarantakos, supra note 166, at 23.
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needed to succeed in college or job-training programs"' -the lowest proportion
in more than a decade.'75
Child poverty is more directly caused by nonmarital parenting than by any other
factor. More than half of the increase in child poverty in the United States between
1980 and 1988 was "accounted for by changes in family structure."176 The U.S. Govern-
ment reports that children who grow up without a father at home are five times more
likely to live in poverty, compared to children living with both parents.' William
Galston, who served as Domestic Policy Advisor to President Clinton, simply said
that "the two-parent family is an American child's best protection against poverty."'78
Marital status is more closely associated with avoiding child poverty than any other
factor. Many studies have shown that children in single-parent families are many times
more likely to be living in poverty than children living with both a mother and father.'79
"Changing family structure also accounted for forty-eight percent of the increase during
the 1980s in deep poverty, and fifty-nine percent of the rise in relative poverty
174 Eric Hoover, Barely Half of High-School Students Who Took the ACT Had College-
Ready Reading Skills, 52 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 10, 2006, at A33, available at http://
chronicle.con/daily/2006/03/2006030101n.htm.; accord ACT, INC., READING BETWEEN THE
LINES: WHAT THE ACT REVEALS ABOUT CO_.EGE READINESS IN READING 1 (2006) [hereinafter
READING BETWEEN THE LINES], http://www.act.org/path/policy/pdf/reading__summary.pdf
(amazingly, the report controlled for gender, family income, and race, but stunningly makes no
mention of family structure).
175 READING BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 174, at 2.
176 David J. Eggebeen & Daniel T. Lichter, Race, Family Structure, and Changing Poverty
Among American Children, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 801,806 (1991). According to former Clinton
White House aide William Galston, "child poverty rates today would be one-third lower if
family structure had not changed so dramatically since 1960. Fifty-one percent of the increase
in child poverty observed during the 1980s is attributable to changes in family structure during
that period." WADE F. HORN, NAT'L FATHERHOOD INST., FATHER FACTS 78 (1998).
177 NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
SURVEY ON CHID HEALTH (1993). "[Ten] percent of children in two-parent families were in
poverty, compared to [fifty] percent in female householder families." FED. INTERAGENCY
FORUM ON CHILD & FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS
OF WELL-BEING 14 (1997).
178 ELAINE CIULLA KAMARCK & WILLIAM A. GALSTON, PUITTING CHILDREN FIRST: A
PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR THE 1990S, at 12 (1990).
179 See NAT'LCOMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 253 (1991) ("Children who live with only one parent, usually their
mothers, are six times as likely to be poor as children who live with both parents."); see also
William J. Doherty, The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Fathering as a ContestedArena
of Academic Discourse, in GENERATIVE FATHERING: BEYOND DEFICIT PERSPECTIVES 217,
221 (Alan J. Hawkins & David C. Dollahite eds., 1997) (66.3% of all children living with
mothers who had never married were living below the poverty line, compared to only 10.6%
of children living in two-parent families in 1993); Eggebeen & Lichter, supra note 176, at
806-07 (changes in family structure account for one-third of the increased child poverty between
1960 and 1988, and nearly sixty percent of the rise in child poverty during the 1980s).
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among U.S. children." ' A recent update led by University of Virginia sociologist
W. Bradford Wilcox of an earlier study about "why marriage matters" for, inter alia,
children notes that disruption of the intact marital family significantly reduces the
likelihood that children will graduate from college or achieve high-paying jobs.'
Thus, "[a]s a matter of public policy, if not of morality, it pays for society to approve of
marriage as the best setting for children."'8 2
"[C]hildren growing up in [single-parent] households are at greater risk for
experiencing... vandalism, violence, and criminal acts."'8 3 Separation of children from
their fathers is "the engine driving our most urgent social problems, from crime to
adolescent pregnancy to child sexual abuse to domestic violence against women."'
For instance, children in single-parent families exhibit higher rates of teenage sexual
activity, teen pregnancy, and childbirth.8 5 Children growing up in single-parent house-
holds are at a significantly increased risk for drug abuse as teenagers. 6
The relationship between adolescent (especially male) criminal behavior and
family structure has long been known. One study reported that "the 'relationship
between crime and one-parent families' is 'so strong that controlling for family con-
figuration erases the relationship between race and crime and between low income
and crime.''7 Another recent study confirmed that the "presence of a residential
and biological father reduces the likelihood of violent behavior by his sons grown
to adulthood," and "[d]ata analyzed across the U.S. indicate that father absence, rather
than poverty, [is] the stronger predictor of young men's violent behavior."'88 The
likelihood that a young male "will engage in criminal activity doubles if he is raised
without a father, and triples if he lives in a neighborhood with a high concentration
of single-parent families."'8 9 A statement of family experts noted: "Boys raised out-
side of intact marriages are two to three times more likely to commit a crime leading
to incarceration by the time they are in their early thirties, even after controlling for
80 Eggebeen & Lichter, supra note 176, at 807. Moreover, researchers at Pennsylvania
State University have concluded that if family breakdown had not deprived many families
of a male breadwinner, "the child poverty rate would have declined to 13.8% in 1988."
Myron Magnet, The American Family, 1992, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 43.
181 TWENTY-SIX CONCLUSIONS, supra note 124, at 22.
182 Michael Novak, Families: The BestAnti-Poverty Plan, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1993, at Fl.
183 Bronfenbrenner, supra note 149, at 34; see also BLANKENHORN, supra note 124, at
26-32 (children without fathers are also more likely to be involved in youth violence than
children with fathers in the home).
184 BLANKENHORN, supra note 124, at 1.
185 Id. at 46.
6 Denton & Kampfe, supra note 160, at 480.
187 BLANKENHORN, supra note 124, at 31.
8 Wade C. Mackey & Ronald S. Immerman, The Presence of the Social Father in Inhibit-
ing Young Men's Violence, 44 MANKIND Q. 339, 339 (2004).
189 M. ANNE HILL&JUNE O'NEILL, CITY UNIV. OFN.Y., UNDERCLASS BEHAVIORS INTHE
UNITED STATES: MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS (1993).
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race, family background, neighborhood quality, and cognitive ability."'' Being
raised in an intact marital family statistically reduces the risk that children will be
either the victims or perpetrators of crime. 9' The rate of incarceration of children
coming from marital intact homes is one-half the rate of incarceration of children
from single homes (and one-third the rate of children from stepfamilies). '92
"[C]hildren are much more likely to die outside of an intact, married home than they
are to die inside an intact, married home."' 93 For example, "[a] recent study in the jour-
nal Pediatrics found that preschool children in homes with an unrelated adult were
nearly 50 times as likely to die because of physical abuse, compared to children in
intact, married homes."' 94 Another study reviewing national crime data from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Census Bureau found that nonmarital ("diverse")
family forms "significantly contributes to... acquaintance- and stranger-related
homicide rates, as well as to the total ... homicide rate, for white families. '9 5
Health benefits of other kinds also are present. For example, "[c]hildren born to
two married, biological parents are less likely to be diagnosed with asthma and less
likely to experience an asthma-related emergency than children born into other family
configurations."' 96 Likewise, a recent study notes that in Sweden, where single mothers
do not suffer the poverty that accompanies single parenting in many other countries,
children of single parents had "more than double the risk of psychiatric disease; suicide
or attempted suicide, and alcohol-related disease, and more than three times the risk
of drug-related disease compared with their counterparts in two-parent households."1 97
190 MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 133, at 11.
'9' TWENTY-SIX CONCLUSIONS, supra note 124, at 29.
192 Id.
' W. Bradford Wilcox, Child Tragedies: Missing Marriage, N.Y. POST ONLINE EDITION,
Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/63138.htm.
194 id.
'9 Karen F. Parker & Tracy Johns, Urban Disadvantage and Types of Race-Specific Homi-
cide: Assessing the Diversity in Family Structures in the Urban Context, 39 J. RES. CRIME
& DELUNQ. 277, 292 (2002).
196 FRAGILE FAMILES & CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, CHILDREN'S ELEVATED RISK OF
ASTHMA IN UNMARRIED FAMILIES (2005), http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/briefs/
ResearchBrief32.pdf.
197 Margaret Whitehead & Paula Holland, What Puts Children of Lone Parents at a
Health Disadvantage?, 361 LANCET 271 (2003), available at http://www.thelancet.com/
journals/lancet/section?volume=361 &issue=9354&section= Commentary; see also Anna
L. Christopoulos, Relationships Between Parents' Marital Status and University Students'
Mental Health, Views of Mothers and Views of Fathers: A Study in Bulgaria, 34 J. DIVORCE
& REMARRIAGE 179, 179-80 (2001) ("Students from divorced homes reported significantly
more psychological difficulties in general than their peers from intact homes. [They also]
reported significantly more somatic complaints and problems of depression than students
whose parents were married.... [S]tudents from divorced homes reported significantly more
negative attitudes toward their fathers than students from intact homes. A similar trend was
obtained with respect to views of mothers.").
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Alternative relationships are sometimes described as equivalent to marital
families. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, disappointing outcomes for children result from
even the most promising alternative family forms. For example, childhood in step-
families, which may come the closest to intact families in terms of structure, pales
by comparison to intact marital families of the child's mother and father. While many
reconstituted families succeed and raise wonderful children, studies consistently
report that step-families provide a demonstrably less favorable environment for child-
rearing than the intact marital family (of biological father and mother).'98 For example,
a recent report noted that "children living with stepparents (usually a stepfather) are
more than forty times as likely to be killed or sexually abused, compared to children
living in an intact, married family."' 99
One of the most complete compilations of data on outcomes of nonmarital
cohabitation in the United States is contained in an extensive report by sociologists
David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead.2°° They conclude that nonmarital
cohabitation in the United States "has weakened marriage and the intact, two-parent
family and thereby damaged our social wellbeing, especially that of women and
children."' They noted: "[V]irtually all research on the topic has determined that
the chances of divorce ending a marriage preceded by cohabitation are significantly
greater than for a marriage not preceded by cohabitation."202 Likewise, "[a]ccording
to recent studies cohabitants tend not to be as committed as married couples in their
dedication to the continuation of the relationship.., and they are more oriented
toward their own personal autonomy. '20 3 That instability in the home is a cause of
118 See, e.g., Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato
and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis, 15 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 355 (2001); Paul R. Amato & Bruce
Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children: A Meta-Analysis, 110 PSYCHOL.
BuLL. 26 (1991); Debra L. Foley et al., Risks for Conduct Disorder Symptoms Associated
with Parental Alcoholism in Stepfather Families Versus Intact Families from a Community
Sample, 45 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 687 (2004); see also Marilyn Coleman &
Lawrence H. Ganong, Remarriage and Stepfamily Research in the 1980s: Increased Interest
in an Old Family Form, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 925,928 (1990); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr.,
The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents and Children after Remarriage, in
REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING: CURRENT RESEARCH AND THEORY 42, 59 (Kay Pasley
& Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 1987); Nicholas Zill, Behavior, Achievement, and Health
Problems Among Children in Stepfamilies: Findings From a National Survey of Child
Health, in IMPACT OF DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND STEPPARENTING ON CHILDREN 352,
362 (E. Mavis Hetherington & Josephine D. Arasteh eds., 1988).
199 Wilcox, supra note 193, at 1.
200 DAVID POPENOE & BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, SHOULD
WE LIVE TOGETHER? WHAT YOUNG ADULTS NEED TO KNow ABOUT COHABITATION BEFORE
MARRIAGE, ACOMPREHENsIvEREVIEwOFRECENTRESEARCH (1999), http://www.smartnariages
.com/cohabit.htnl [hereinafter POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER?].
201 Id. at 16.
202 Id. at 4.
203 id. at 5.
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detriment for children. "In general, cohabiting relationships tend to be less satisfactory
than marriage relationships. ' '204 Additionally,
[a]nnual rates of depression among cohabiting couples are more
than three times what they are among married couples. And wo-
men in cohabiting relationships are more likely than married
women to suffer physical and sexual abuse. Some research has
shown that aggression is at least twice as common among
cohabitors as it is among married partners.20 5
That translates into impaired parenting for children. Another study notes that
cohabiting men are four times more likely than husbands to cheat on their partners,
and cohabiting women are eight times more likely than wives to be unfaithful to
their partners.2 6 Thus, it is not surprising that "three quarters of children born to
cohabiting parents will see their parents split up before they reach age sixteen,
whereas only about a third of children born to married parents face a similar
fate. 207 Studies also indicate that in cohabiting couples there are "far higher levels
of child abuse than is found in intact families. 2 8 Other studies have documented
that rates of domestic violence are higher and the type of violence more severe in
nonmarital cohabitation than in marriage. 2' Likewise, "[w]hile the 1996 poverty
rate for children living in married couple households was about 6%, it was 31% for
children living in cohabiting households., '210 Another study noted that children of
cohabiting unmarried couples are economically disadvantaged compared to children
of married parents, with a mean household income per adult of $7,200 compared to
$10,800 for married couples."' Further, white children living with cohabiting
couples are four times more likely to live below poverty level than children living
with married couples.212 These risks of cohabitation are not unique to the United
States. For example, "the widespread substitution of cohabitation for marriage in
204 Id. at 6.
205 Id. at 7.
206 MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, supra note 133, at 9.
207 POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, SHOULD WE LIVE TOGETHER?, supra note 200, at 7.
208 Id. at 8.
209 See, e.g., Jan E. Stets & Murray A. Straus, The Marriage License as a Hitting License:
A Comparison ofAssaults in Dating, Cohabiting, and Married Couples, 4 J. FAM. VIOLENCE
161 (1989).
210 POPENOE & WHITEHEAD, SHOULD WE LivE TOGETHER?, supra note 200, at 8.
211 Wendy D. Manning & Daniel T. Lichter, Parental Cohabitation and Children's Eco-
nomic Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 998 (1996), as described in S. Edwards,
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Sweden has given that country the highest rate of family dissolution and single
parenting in the developed world. 213
One of the most exhaustive and impressive collections of data on single mothers
and cohabiting couples raising children is The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study, completed under the direction of Professor Sara McLanahan of Princeton
University.214 The study finds that cohabiting couples are not like married couples
in critical respects, nor are single mothers like "Murphy Brown. 2 5 Those family
environments are exceptionally unstable and tenuous (factors that do not bode well
for child development). There is often greater stress in those families, often trans-
lating into impaired or dysfunctional parenting. While stable cohabiting couples
share many characteristics with stable marital families, stability in cohabitation (unlike
in marital families) is the small exception rather than the general rule.216
It is indisputable that children born out of wedlock are bom into lives of disadvan-
tage. So serious were the harms to children and society that at common law an entire
branch of the law of domestic relations was established to promote childbearing within
marriage. 217 English common law (and until less than forty years ago American law)
adopted the radical strategy of declaring the very existence of children born out of
wedlock as illegitimate-contrary to the policy of the law and society.21 Thankfully,
that legal status is now abolished, but the real harm remains.
E. Dual-Gender Parenting and the Challenge of Lesbigay Parenting
Advocates and supporters of lesbigay parenting also frequently assert the "no
difference" claim-that there is "no difference" between children who are raised by
lesbian or gay parents and children raised in intact marital families.219 Increasingly,
213 Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing DAVID POPENOE, DIS-
TURBING THE NEST: FAMILY CHANGE AND DECLINE IN MODERN SOCIETIES 173-74 (1988)).
214 See generally FRAGILE FAMILmS AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, http://www.fragile
families.princeton.edu (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
215 FRAGILE FAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, LOOKING FOR "MURPHY BROWN":
ARE COLLEGE-EDUCATED, SINGLE MOTHERS UNIQUE? (2003), http://www.fragilefamilies
.princeton.edu/briefs/ResearchBriefl 8.pdf.
216 FRAGI.EFAMILIES AND CHILD WELLBEING STUDY, MATERNAL STRESS AND MOTHERING
BEHAVIORS IN STABLE AND UNSTABLE FAMIIES (2004), http://www.fragilefamilies.princeton
.edulbriefs/ResearchBrief27.pdf.
217 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443 ("The main end and design of marriage
.[is] to ascertain and fix upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, the
maintenance, and the education of the children should belong."); see also HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 149-203 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing the history of illegitimacy in Anglo-American law).
218 CLARK, supra note 217, at 155-56.
219 See, e.g., Wardle, Considering the Impacts on Children, supra note 115, at 550-56;
Wardle, Parenthood and the Limits, supra note 115, at 192; Wardle, Parentlessness, supra
[Vol. 15:203
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN PARENTAGE LAW
the issue is being addressed by lawmakers. As of November 2005, at least twenty
states and the District of Columbia had either legislation or an appellate court ruling
taking a specific legal position regarding whether gays and lesbians could adopt
children.22' Twelve states and the District of Columbia allow lesbigay adoption (four
by legislation and nine by court ruling), while eight states ban lesbigay adoption (four
by legislation and four by court ruling). 22 By February 21, 2006, it was reported
that proposals to ban lesbigay adoption were pending in at least sixteen states.
222
The most common argument for allowing lesbigay legal parentage is that there is
"no difference" for children between being raised by heterosexual parents and being
raised by a same-sex couple. Some courts have explicitly embraced the "no difference"
claim. In Baehr v. Miike,2 3 the first American decision to order same-sex marriage,
224
the Hawaii court based its decision significantly on the finding that same-sex couples
and heterosexual couples were equivalent as parents because love is what matters
most in parenting:
125. The evidence presented by Plaintiffs and Defendant estab-
lishes that the single most important factor in the development of
a happy, healthy and well-adjusted child is the nurturing relation-
ship between parent and child.
More specifically, it is the quality of parenting or the "sensitive
care-giving" described by David Brodzinsky, which is the most sig-
nificant factor that affects the development of a child.
132. Gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples can be as
fit and loving parents, as non-gay men and women and different-sex
couples.225
Likewise, in Baker v. State,226 the first state supreme court decision holding that
same-sex couples must be given the right to marry or to enter into an equivalent legal
note 115, at 323; Wardle, Potential Impact, supra note 115, at 842-44; Wardle, Preference
for Marital Couple Adoption, supra note 115, at 377-78.
220 See generally Lynn D. Wardle, The "Inner Lives" of Children in Lesbigay Adoption:
Narratives and Other Concerns, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 511, 512-15 (2006).
221 Id. at 513.
222 Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up, USATODAY, Feb. 21, 2006, at 1A
(noting that bills or ballot proposals to ban lesbigay adoption have been introduced in at least
sixteen states early in 2006).
223 CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), afid, 950 P.2d 1234
(Haw. 1997).
224 The Hawaii trial court enjoined the Department of Health, which issued marriage
licenses, "from denying an application for a marriage license solely because the applicants are
of the same sex." Id. at *22, 1 2.
225 Id. at *17, 11 125, 132.
226 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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status with comparable benefits, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the State's argu-
ment about the importance of dual-gender marriage for children and child-rearing.
227
The gender differences were dismissed because "such differences are not necessarily
found in comparing any given man and any given woman. ' 22' As to parenting, the
court rejected the State's argument that same-sex and male-female couples were
different from each other in any significant way, noting that "to the extent that the
state's purpose in licensing civil marriage was, and is, to legitimize children and provide
for their security, the statutes plainly exclude many same-sex couples who are no
different from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives."'229 The majority
opinion of Chief Justice Amestoy further stated that same-sex and heterosexual parents
"are similarly situated' in terms of the state's interest in protecting children by linking
parentage with marriage.230 The court specifically held that there was "extreme logical
disjunction between the classification and the stated purposes of the law-protecting
children and 'furthering the link between procreation and child rearing."'231
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health,232 ruled that the Massachusetts Constitution required that same-sex marriage
be legal in the Commonwealth. It reasoned, inter alia, that to deny gay and lesbian cou-
ples marriage curiously "confers an official stamp of approval on [a] destructive stereo-
type that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex
relationships and are not worthy of respect." '233 It emphasized that same-sex couples, as
a group, are indistinguishable from conjugal couples in terms of the state's interests
in marriage, and that "extending civil marriage to same-sex couples reinforc[ed] the
importance of marriage to individuals and communities."234 The Court emphasized:
'There is... no rational relationship between the marriage statute and the Common-
wealth's proffered goal of protecting the 'optimal' child rearing unit." '235 Moreover,
"[ilt cannot be rational under our laws, and indeed it is not permitted, to penalize chil-
dren by depriving them of State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents'
sexual orientation. '"236
227 Id. at 909, 911-12 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
228 Id. at 910.
229 Id. at 882 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
230 Id. (emphasis added in part).
231 Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
232 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
233 Id. at 962 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall wisely chose not to try to explain the
questionable assumption that a policy that some relationships are "unstable and inferior" to con-
jugal unions in terms of accomplishing state interests relating to marriage means that such rela-
tionships "are not worthy of respect." Id. For example, the fact that mothers and sons or brothers
and sisters cannot marry does not mean that those very important relationships are not worthy
of respect.
234 Id. at 965.
235 Id. at 963.
236 Id. at 964.
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Many other judges, however, have concluded that there are rational, if not
compelling, grounds for lawmakers to conclude that conjugal marital parenting
(dual-gender parenting) is in the best interests of children.237 Justice Cordy, dis-
senting in Goodridge, concluded that the Massachusetts legislature, in reserving
marriage to opposite-sex couples, reasonably may have believed that the ideal of
dual-gender parenting should be preserved whenever possible,238 and that "being
raised by a same-sex couple has not yet been shown to be the absolute equivalent
of being raised by one's married biological parents." '239 Likewise, Justice Sossman
acknowledged the importance of dual-gender parenting in her dissent in Goodridge.24°
In Lofton v. Kearney,24 a federal district court upheld Florida's no-homosexual-
adoptions rule, noting that "a child's best interest is to be raised in a home stabilized
by marriage, in a family consisting of both a mother and a father." '242 Affirming, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the legislature could reasonably con-
clude that "children benefit from the presence of both a father and mother in the
home." '243 Even Justice Brennan acknowledged that"' [t]he optimal situation for the
child is to have both an involved mother and an involved father."' 2"
The social science evidence fails to support the claims of equivalence between
marital conjugal parenting and lesbigay parenting. We certainly do not yet know
the full effects of homosexual parenting on children. The evidence is just beginning
to be assembled, and it is far from reliable or complete. Most of the completed
studies to date suffer from significant methodological flaws such as defects in
design, sample bias, sample size, very poor (or no) control groups, inappropriate
measures, misuse of measures, and misinterpretation of data. It may take another
generation before substantial, reliable data about the effects of homosexual parent-
ing on children is available and before social scientists begin to accumulate signi-
ficant data showing the effects on children of lesbigay child-rearing (just as it took
a generation for the children of no-fault divorce to reach maturity and to begin to
speak out-allowing social scientists to discover that children suffer significant harm
237 See generally Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (2006); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d
259, 266-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 29
A.D.3d 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451,461-64 (Az. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied,
May 26, 2004.
238 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 999-1000 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 1000.
240 Id. at 979-82 (Sossman, J., dissenting).
241 157 F.Supp.2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001), affid sub nom Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Chil-
dren & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11 th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
242 Kearney, 157 F.Supp.2d at 1383.
243 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819.
244 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 614 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting HENRY BILLER, PATERNAL DEPRIVATION 10 (1974)). This language is
quoted and endorsed in In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
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and some are permanently disadvantaged by their parents' divorce, contrary to the
general expectations of psychologists in the 1970s that divorce usually caused only
minor and temporary setback for children).245
Two benchmark surveys were published in 2001 that acknowledged the metho-
dological flaws in the social science studies of "lesbigay" parenting. In the American
Sociological Review, researchers Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz, sympathetic to
lesbigay parenting, examined the social science literature that found "no difference"
between heterosexual and lesbigay parents. 246 They conducted a thorough exami-
nation of one meta-analysis concluding "no difference" and twenty-one particular
studies reaching the same conclusion and found significant flaws in study design,
sample groups, controls, methodologies, and in matching the data reported with the
conclusions reached ("no difference"). Particularly, they found significant differ-
ences between children raised by lesbigay parents and heterosexual parents relating
to sexual orientation, gender-appropriate activities, and homoerotic behaviors.247
Likewise, social scientists Robert Lerner, Ph.D., and Althea K. Nagai, Ph.D.,
who conducted research for an organization critical of lesbigay parenting, carefully
examined forty-nine published articles concerning the impact that homosexual
parents have on the rearing of their children. Most of the studies claim that there
is no difference in child outcomes based on parental sexual orientation248 and found
that the scientific methods in all of them were seriously flawed. Lerner and Nagai
conclude: "[T]hese studies display an unreflective, rote-like application of statistical
methods. The researchers seem to have spent no time reflecting upon what these
statistical tests and methods mean. . . . [Tihese small studies claiming non-
significant results must be treated as entirely inconclusive. 249
Several other studies reach the same conclusion about the flawed social science.
Richard E. Redding of the University of Virginia has cited the research used by advo-
cates of the policy "that parental sexual orientation should be irrelevant in child custody
245 BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 45-107 (1996); WAITE &
GALLAGHER, supra note 124, at 1-12, 124-40.
246 Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents
Matter?, 66 AM Soc. REV. 159, 159-60, 178-79 (2001).
247 Id. at 164--69.
248 ROBERT LERNER & ALTHEA K. NAGAI, MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, No BASIS: WHAT THE
STUDIES DON'T TELL Us ABOuT SAME-SEX PARENTING 3-9 (2001) [hereinafter LERNER &
NAGAI, NO BASIS].
249 Id. at 108; see also Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, Marriage Policy and the Metho-
dology ofResearch on Homosexual Parenting, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN AGENDA FOR STRENGTHENING MARRIAGE 155, 157
(Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2003); see also Philip A. Belcastro et al., A Review of Data Based
Studies Addressing the Affects of Homosexual Parenting on Children's Sexual and Social
Functioning, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 105, 106 (1993) ("The conclusion that there are
no significant differences in children reared by lesbian mothers versus heterosexual mothers
is not supported by the published research data base.").
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decisions... [a]s an example of liberal bias affecting research interpretation and its use
in advocacy. '250 Professor Redding's colleague, Professor Stephen Nock, "a leading
scholar of marriage at the University of Virginia, wrote in March 2001 ... that every
study on [the effect of same-sex marriage on the couple's children] 'contained at
least one fatal flaw' and 'not a single one was conducted according to generally
accepted standards of scientific research.""'25 In a court affidavit, Nock declared that
all of the research "including the study considered the most rigorous, cannot be taken
as establishing the claim that scientific research shows no differences between the
children of gay parents and the children of heterosexual parents in terms of gender
identity or sexual orientation. 252 George A. Rekers, Distinguished Professor of
Neuropsychiatry and Behavioral Science Emeritus at the University of South Carolina
School of Medicine and a Fellow of the Academy of Clinical Psychology, has reached
the same conclusion.253 He described the "no difference" studies as "with very few
exceptions... methodologically flawed. ' '21 "[T]hey should be considered no more
than exploratory pilot work which suggest directions for future rigorous research
studies" because they are "not, in fact, substantiated by adequate scientific research."z"
One of the biggest problems with research dealing with the effects of lesbigay
parenting on children is that it does not address the hard questions about the effect
of homosexual activity by residential parents on children. What are the long-term
effects on children with regard to inter-gender relations? Courtship? Personal inti-
macy? Sexual practices? Their physical and mental health? Use and abuse of alco-
hol and drugs? Their entering marriage? Sustaining marriage? Spousal interactions
in marriage? Other relationships? Childbearing? Their parenting? Relations with
grandchildren? Researchers need to examine the kinds of behavior that are most
likely to be influenced by parental sexual behaviors-including the sexual behaviors,
interests, and identification of children, premature or delayed sexual behavior, risky
sexual behaviors, sexual self-identification, fidelity in sexual relations, and promis-
cuity in sexual relations. Will those relationships be stable? Emotionally healthy? Ful-
filling? How will extended family relationships of children raised by gay and lesbian
parents be affected? Researchers have not even begun to ask these critical questions.
The effects of lesbigay parenting on children over time is a major hole in exist-
ing research. Even Charlotte Patterson, one of the most avid supporters of lesbigay
' Richard E. Redding, Sociopolitical Diversity in Psychology; The Case for Pluralism,
56 AM. PSYCHOL. 205, 207 (2001).
"' Don Browning & Elizabeth Marquardt, Editorial, A Marriage Made in History?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A25.
252 Affidavit of Stephen Lowell Nock, in Halpern v. Att'y Gen. of Can., No. 684/00, [ 140
(Ont. Super. Ct. of Justice, Div. Ct.) (March 2001).
2" George Rekers & Mark Kilgus, Studies of Homosexual Parenting: A Critical Review,
14 REGENT U. L. REv. 343 (2004).
254 Id. at 345.
25 Id. at 345-46.
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parenting, has agreed that "longitudinal studies that follow lesbian and gay families
over time are still badly needed.,
256
Surprisingly, even many of the methodologically biased, pro-lesbigay-parenting
studies cited in support of the "no difference" claim suggest that there are some signifi-
cant risks for children raised by lesbian or gay couples. In some studies, it appears
that children raised by same-sex couples are more likely than children raised by hetero-
sexual parents to be drawn to a homosexual self-identity, homo-erotic attraction, and
early, risky sexual behavior. The leading pro-lesbigay parenting study of Golombok
and Tasker reveals, in the words of one reviewer, that "there is a statistically significant
difference between [children with heterosexual parents and children with homo-
sexual parents] when one compares ratings of same sex [sic] attraction."" Many other
"no difference" studies also have produced data indicating "some significant differences
between children raised by lesbian mothers versus heterosexual mothers in their family
relationships, gender identity and gender behavior."258 A notable but small critical study
found substantial differences between children raised by lesbian mothers and chil-
dren raised by single heterosexual mothers in terms of how many wanted to marry, how
many wanted to have children, and in the sexual self-identities of the children.259 Even
Stacey and Biblarz acknowledged that there seem to be differences between children
raised by lesbigay parents and heterosexual parents relating to sexual orientation, gender-
appropriate activities, and homoerotic behaviors. 2 ° One psychological research
specialist concluded: "The clearest effect on children of the sexual orientation of their
parents seems to be on the children's attitude toward sexuality and their acceptance
of an experimentation with homosexual activity. ' 261' Homosexual attraction for adoles-
cents is fraught with serious individual and social risks including concerns about
suicide, depression, and heightened rates of risky sexual behavior. Thus, the "no differ-
ence" claim is demonstrably false concerning adolescent sexual orientation and behavior.
Furthermore, the social science that purports to show "no difference" defies all
theories of child development. As Stacey and Biblarz admitted:
256 CHARLOTTE PATrERSON, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, LESBIAN & GAY PARENTING 15
(1995) (cited in Timothy J. Dailey, Homosexual Parenting: Placing Children at Risk, FAMILY
RESEARCH CouNcIL (2002), http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=ISO1J3).
257 Warren Throckmorton, Do Parents Influence the Sexual Preference of Children? (Feb.
19, 2004), http://www.drthrockmorton.com/article.asp?id=39; see also Belcastro et al., supra,
note 249, at 112, 119 (discussing small study that reports significant sexual orientation differ-
ence); Paul Cameron & Kirk Cameron, Children Of Homosexual Parents Report Childhood
Difficulties, 90 PSYCHOL REPS. 71-82, http://www.faniilyresearchinst.org/FRIjhomokids.html
(last visited Aug. 28, 2006) (examining narratives of children raised by lesbigay parents, twenty-
seven percent of older daughters and twenty percent of older sons described themselves as
homosexual or bisexual).
258 Belcastro et al., supra note 249, at 119.
219 Id. at 108.
26 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 246, at 167-69.
261 Williams & Kelly, supra note 163, at 28.
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Virtually all the published research claims to find no differences in the
sexuality of children reared by lesbigay parents and those raised by
nongay parents-but none of the studies that report this finding
attempts to theorize about such an implausible outcome. Yet it is dif-
ficult to conceive of a credible theory of sexual development that would
not expect the adult children of lesbigay parents to display a some-
what higher incidence of homoerotic desire, behavior, and identity
than children of heterosexual parents.262
Parents' behaviors are known to have a powerful influence on children because
children grow up imitating their parents.
Nonetheless, it seems quite likely that on some measures children raised by gay
and lesbian parents will perform quite well. For instance, there is little reason to
assume that many prospective parents who also want to engage in homosexual
relations will not be just as able or willing as heterosexual married adults to teach
their children to read, to provide nutritious food, to provide adequate shelter and
clothing, or to provide financially for their needs. Given the demographics of the
gay and lesbian sub-groups of American population, on some measures (perhaps
educational and financial-related measures, for instance) one might rationally
expect children raised by gays and lesbians to perform as well or even possibly
better than children raised in the broad, general heterosexual parent population.
However, those data do not address the real point of concern about lesbigay
parentage. Very few, if any, children will not be provided adequate shelter, cloth-
ing, food, and basic education in our society today. Those factors are "givens" in
virtually all child placement and parentage decisions. We do not need to auction off
children to the prospective parents who can offer the best educational, nutritional,
or socio-economic status for the children. Proof that gay and lesbian couples may
provide more resources and resource-based opportunities or that children who are
raised by adults who provide such resources will perform better in some areas (edu-
cational achievement, grades, college entrance, etc.), therefore, is not dispositive of
the parentage question.
The quantitative research into lesbigay parenting is very immature and unstable.
Even Charlotte Patterson has admitted that the "research on lesbian and gay parents
and their children... is still limited in extent.... Longitudinal studies that follow
lesbian and gay parent families over time are still needed."26
It appears, however, that dual-gender marital parenting has some significant health
advantages for children. For instance, some research shows that "positive male figures
262 Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 246, at 163.
263 PATTERSON, supra note 256, at 15.
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in the lives of children are significantly related to a decrease of children requiring
medication for behavior problems. 264
F. The Importance of the Biological Tie of Parentage
Another "formal" connection that some of the parentage law reform proposals seem
to disregard is the importance of biological ties. While those do not always ripen into
meaningful parenting, history suggests that the biological bond between parent and child
can be a powerful force for good, as Professors Robert and Elizabeth Scott have noted:
Scholars representing very diverse perspectives and ideologies have
emphasized the importance of the biological bond between parents
and children as an influence on parental behavior. Evolutionary psy-
chologists argue that biological parenthood inclines parents to pro-
tect and care for their children. By this account, parents nurture their
young (and have little inclination to nurture the children of others)
in order to protect their genetic heritage and maximize its survival.
Researchers point to the much lower rates of violence directed to-
ward biological children than toward stepchildren and non-biologi-
cal family members as evidence of this biological inclination.
Less debatable is the powerful affective bond between parent
and child. At the birth of their child, parents undertake a long-term
relationship which usually builds incrementally and involves a deep
emotional attachment. This relationship is distinctive among others
characterized by emotional attachment, constituting what social
psychologists describe as a "crescive bond," which links irreplace-
able individuals into a continuing relationship. For these bonds
to form, the relationship must be an important component of the
parents' personal and social identity and must provide rewards,
particularly self-esteem. Research suggests that the role of parent
is among the most important in defining personal identity for both
men and women.
The affective bond provides powerful grounding for a parental
precommitment to care for the welfare of one's children.2 65
264 Warren Throckrnorton, Is Psychology in Denial?, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3,2006, at A12
(reviewing ROGERS WRIGHT & NICHOLAS CUMMINGS, DESTRUCrIVE TRENDS IN MENTAL
HEALTH: THE WELL-INTENTIONED PATH TO HARM (2005)).
265 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401,
2433-34 (1995).
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Recent research has emphasized the potentially protective shield that the biological
bond to a parent provides for children.266 Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson has identi-
fied more than seventy studies that show increased risk of sexual abuse of girls in bro-
ken families.26 7 One probable explanation for the greater molestation is the absence
of biological bonds with the men in the step- or cohabitation families into which the
daughters' custodial mothers take them by remarriage or nonmarital cohabitation.268
Moreover, the biological bond may matter even more from a child-centered per-
spective than from an adult perspective. Biological parentage often matters to chil-
dren, for reasons suggested in an editorial in a major national newspaper some years
ago that illustrates the importance to children of parental bonds which from an adult
perspective would be considered tragically dysfunctional:
In a story making the rounds among child welfare workers,
Billy, who is 12, has run away at least twice from the foster home
where he was placed by the [Massachusetts] Department of Youth
266 See, e.g., Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks of Not Living
with Both Parents, 6 ETHoLoGY & SOClOBIOLOGY 197 (1985) (explaining that children living
with both natural parents are significantly less likely to be abused than children living with
one natural parent and one stepparent); Joy L. Lightcap et al., Child Abuse: A Test of Some
Predictions from Evolutionary Theory, 3 ETHoLOGY & SoCIOBIOLOGY 61 (1982) (claiming
that adults lacking a genetic relationship with a child are more likely to neglect or abuse the
child); Scott & Scott, supra note 265, at 2433-34, 2434 n. 104 (citing Margo Wilson, Impacts
of the Uncertainty of Paternity on Family Law, 45 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 216, 222-24
(1987)) (arguing that evolutionary biology supports the claim biological parentage).
267 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children
After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 254-55 (2001) ("[A] review of forty-two publica-
tions observed that '[tihe majority of children who were sexually abused ... appeared to
have come from single[-parent] or reconstituted families."' (alteration in original)).
268 See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application
to ChildAbuse, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1117, 1207-36 (1997) (arguing that the greater risk of abuse
at the hands of adults without a biological link to the child can be explained by absence of
a biological connection); Wilson, supra note 267, at 268 ("[T]he evidence is legion that step-
fathers represent a greater portion of abusers than their incidence in the general population,
suggesting that they are more likely to abuse their daughters than biological fathers."); see
also BLANKENHORN, supra note 124, at 39-40 ("What magnifies the risk of sexual abuse for
children is not the presence of a married father but his absence. More specifically, the
escalating risk of childhood sexual abuse in our society stems primarily from the growing
absence of married fathers and the growing presence of stepfathers, boyfriends, and other
unrelated or transient males."). See generally Wilson, supra note 267, passim (discussing
summaries of numerous studies showing greater likelihood of abuse by biologically unrelated
men than by biological fathers). But see Dana E. Prescott, Biological Altruism, Splitting
Siblings and the Judicial Process: A Child's Right to Constitutional Protection in Family
Dislocation, 71 UMKC L. REv. 623, 633 (2003) (arguing that "an analysis of biological
versus non-biological relationships and the correlation between family (biological parent)
dislocation and sexual victimization of children does yield telling results").
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Services. Each time he went back to his home-to his alcoholic
mother and to his father who routinely beats him. After he was
picked up the second time and asked why he keeps returning to
those dreadful conditions, he replied: "Why, they love me. You
should have seen what they gave me for Christmas."
It turns out that the boy's Christmas present was a $3 pair of
sneakers, and the story is being told to explain the growing feeling
among child welfare professionals that their efforts should be redi-
rected toward families and away from the traditional near-exclusive
concentration on children. The argument is that even in families
usually written off as hopeless, there may be shreds of love upon
which to build; the result of that care and attention could be a
stronger and healthier society.
[The former Massachusetts Commissioner of Youth Services
said:] "We have loaded our kids down with helpers but we have
done little to help their parents."
There is some small amount of evidence that work with fami-
lies is more cost-effective, and certainly cheaper, than working with
a child alone. But even if it were not, it is a challenge that a caring
society should accept.269
I1. REFORMING PARENTAGE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
In the interest of respecting Professor Dwyer's request for some brainstorming
suggestions about how parentage law might be reformed and in hopes of "trigger[ing]
stimulating debate among family law scholars and among many other scholars and
professionals,"27 the following general principles and specific reforms are offered
solely for discussion. They are meant for academic debate primarily, and before they
could be implemented they would need to be modified in light of practical consider-
ations and circumstances.
Seven foundational principles should underlie parentage law and parentage law
reforms:
(1) Every child has a biological father and a biological mother.
(2) Biological connectedness matters in parenting for both adults
and minors; it is generally a positive connection that supports
269 Editorial, "They Love Me", CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 1979, at 28.
270 Dwyer, A Child-CenteredApproach, supra note 2, at 846; see also Meyer, supra note 4,
at 857 (stating that participants were invited "to think creatively and expansively").
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good child-rearing by parents and good developmental out-
comes for children.
(3) Dual-gender parenting is generally a positive factor in parenting;
children who are raised by both a mother and a father generally
experience a degree of protection against some risk factors associ-
ated with child development that may be lacking in single-gender
child-rearing.
(4) Marriage generally provides a positive bond for parenting, and
generally is associated with positive child-rearing outcomes for
children.
(5) The child-rearing environment that generally provides the best op-
portunity for optimal development for children is a home in which
the child is raised by his or her biological father and mother who
are married to each other.
(6) Less-than-ideal (marital-biological-dual-gender) child-rearing
relationships may provide successful environments for children
to develop, but inherent in those alternative child-rearing systems
are increased risks and greater potential obstacles to healthy child
development.
(7) Other quasi-parental relationships (including many actual and some
imitative "extended family relationships") can be very important
to both parents and children and can be very supportive of and
contribute to effective, happy, enriching child development experi-
ences; the law should recognize such relations but distinguish
them from and keep them subordinate to parental relations.
The following ten reform policy proposals might be considered for discussion to
improve American parentage law:
(1) Within thirty days of birth, one father and one mother shall be
recognized or assigned for each child.
(2) The birth mother, her husband, every potential father (i.e., any man
who timely claims or is alleged by the birth mother, or her husband,
or another potential father to have had sexual relations with the
birth mother within ten months prior to the birth of the child), and
every putative egg donor (i.e., women who claim to have donated
their egg(s) to the birth mother) may request within two years
after birth that the child's biological parentage be determined by
DNA testing; unless ordered otherwise for good cause by the tri-
bunal, the birth mother, her husband, and every potential father or
putative egg donor shall (upon pain of incarceration for contempt)
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provide their DNA samples for testing within one week of the
request; the results shall be promptly provided to all parties who
provided samples, and to the parentage tribunal.
(3) If the birth mother of the child is married to a man at the time of
birth, and if both she and her husband sign the birth certificate with-
in twenty-one days of the birth, they both shall be recognized as
the parents of the child by the recording of the birth certificate.
(4) If the birth mother is not married to a man, or if her husband does
not sign the birth certificate, and she signs the birth certificate with-
in twenty-one days of birth, she will be deemed the mother of the
child; thereafter, child protective services shall be notified that the
child has no legal father and may file a petition to establish
paternity, and/or to terminate or reduce parental rights in the case
of abuse, neglect, or dependency.
(5) Beginning twenty-eight days after birth, any marital or putative
biological parent may petition the tribunal (for up to three months
after learning of the birth until the child is two years old) for a
determination that he or she is a legal parent, unless the birth
mother and her husband both have been recognized previously
as the parents of the child.
(6) Priority in the establishment of legal parentage of a child in con-
tested cases should be given first to the biological mother and
father of each child who are married to each other; second, in the
absence of married biological parents, to the responsible unmarried
biological parents who show a high level of parental responsibil-
ity, commitment, bonding, and love; and third, when such are not
available, to a responsible, married biological parent and his or her
lawful opposite-gender spouse who accepts the full responsibili-
ties of parentage, and who shows a high level of parental responsi-
bility, commitment, bonding, and love.
(7) If a child does not have a legal father and legal mother established
within thirty days of birth, the parentage tribunal immediately shall
assign the child a substitute "temporary father" for any missing
father and/or a "temporary mother" for any missing mother from
either the opposite-sex kin of a legal parent, or from a list of men
and women employed and trained to function as "temporary
fathers" and women employed and trained to function as "tempo-
rary mothers" by the department of child protection. When ap-
pointed as "temporary father" or "temporary mother" for a child,
those persons shall exercise full parental rights as a co-parent
with joint legal custody of the child as long as they are assigned
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as the temporary parent. (They shall relate to the other parent
and child as if they are divorced parents with joint legal custody,
with no physical custody, but with the visitation that such divorced
parents without custody normally receive.)
(8) The parental rights of a temporary parent cease and terminate
upon the marriage of the legal (not "temporary") parent of the
child, or upon the adoption of the child by a spouse of the legal
parent, or upon adoption by a man and a woman who are married,
or upon replacement by another temporary parent,
(9) The Governor shall be the ultimate head of the department of
"temporary parents" and shall be responsible for the supervision
of that department. If responsible, trained "temporary parents"
are not available, the governor shall personally be named as
"temporary parent" of the child massing a parent of his or her
gender until adequate trained "temporary parents" are available.
(10) Persons who are not legal parents may petition the tribunal to be
legally recognized as members of the legal extended family as
"quasi-aunts" or "quasi-uncles" or "quasi-grandparents" with the
same legal rights, status, and responsibilities that such biological
extended family members enjoy and with such visitation rights as
the court deems to be in the best interests of the child, with due
respect for and deference to the priority of parental rights of the
child's legal parent(s). The tribunal should recognize, support, and
encourage the formation and exercise of such legally-created
extended family relationships, but those relationships must be
subordinate to the rights, relationship, and responsibilities of the
legal parent(s) and temporary parent(s) regarding their children.
Comment: Because many (and increasing numbers of) children are being born
outside of the optimal child-rearing parental forms, parentage law should be modified
to facilitate the establishment of quasi-parental relationships equivalent to extended
family member relationships (but subordinate and not equal to legal parenthood) for
non-parents who can meet high parental standards and some significant quasi-
parental substance (including proven, long-term care for, trusting and affectionate
parent-like relationship with, and sacrificial commitment to a child), but who are
not and cannot become a parent (because the child already has two parents, or a
parent of the same gender, or the parental presumption bars custody, etc.). Thus,
states should allow the establishment of non-parental quasi-relative relationships-
such as equivalent to grandparent or uncle or aunt relations-for persons who meet
high standards and show some significant quasi-parental bond of substance and
commitment. Since all humans and all human relationships are imperfect, some
20061 259
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
allowance must be made for adults' failures and short-comings and mistakes. None-
theless, parentage law should clearly recognize, prioritize, encourage, reinforce, and
communicate the value of conjugal marital and biological parenting.27'
CONCLUSION: UNITING FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN PARENTAGE LAW
Considering how parentage law can be improved is a valuable exercise, and the
convener of the Parentage Roundtable and publishers of the Parentage Symposium
are to be commended for their valuable contribution to the parentage law reform
debate. Just as consideration of how changes in parentage law might improve it, so
also the benefits and value of existing forms and structures ought to be carefully
reconsidered. More than a decade ago, respected social scientists Sara McLanahan
and Gary Sandefur concluded their review of the social science evidence regarding
parenting by single adults with a surprising declaration. This declaration has rele-
vance for students of possible parentage law reforms:
If we were asked to design a system for making sure that chil-
dren's basic needs were met, we would probably come up with
something quite similar to the two-parent family idea.... The fact
that both adults have a biological connection to the child would
increase the likelihood that the parents would identify with the child
and be willing to sacrifice for that child, and it would reduce the
likelihood that either parent would abuse the child.272
Marriage strengthens the bond between parents and children, thus increasing the likeli-
hood "that children ha[ve] access to the time and money of two adults [and] ...
provid[ing] a system of checks and balances that promote[s] quality parenting." '273
The conclusion of Professors McLanahan and Sandefur reflects George Santayana's
famous observation that "[p]rogress, far from consisting in change, depends on reten-
tiveness.... Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."274
271 The term "marital parenting" means conjugal marital parenting by a father and mother
who are married to each other, and, ideally and preferably, who are the biological father and
mother of the child[ren]. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Mar-
riage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581,595 (1999) ("Not only do children need two parents; it also seems
that ideally a child should have both a mother and a father."); Wardle, Multiply and
Replenish, supra note 115, at passim (advocating marriage links to safe sex, responsible
procreation, and optimal child-rearing).
272 SARA McLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HURTS, WHAT HELPS 38 (1994).
273 id.
274 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (Dover 1980). This quote was brought
to my attention by Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The InherentAuthor-
ity of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REv. 179, 235 (2005).
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While considering possible parentage law reforms, one must also recognize the lessons
that human history and experience teach. As Santayana suggested, in our quest for
progress in parentage law, we can ignore what past generations experienced and
learned about parenting only at the painful cost (and often the terrible cost for children)
of having to relearn difficult lessons and rediscover forgotten realities. Human experi-
ence teaches that biological connection, marriage, and dual-gender parenting provide
substantial benefits in child-rearing. The law historically has recognized those benefits
and preferred those forms in order to promote the substance of good child-rearing.
Parentage reform proposals and discussions clearly should not ignore or undervalue the
contributions of those forms, systems, relations, and environments in parenting.
To ignore form in pursuit of substance in parenting has been disastrous and would
invite chaos for children, families, and society. Substance alone, in the abstract, is not
a very sound criteria for deciding cases or a basis for public policy unless it is manifest
in forms and structures that give it objective reality, promoting and benefitting children,
families, and society. As Susan Bandes has acknowledged, the "law cannot accom-
modate the endless subtleties and variations that might exist among emotional states
.... [At some point,] these variables render the translation into legal context impos-
sible[.]"275 By leveling form and treating all structures as equal, the most socially
valuable relationships are diminished and the most trivial are enhanced.
Marital-biological parentage by a mother and a father unites both form and sub-
stance. Marriage reinforces and enhances the ties of biological parentage and provides
an additional bond that both generates and strengthens natural affection.
Parents act in a dual capacity-for themselves and for society. They act for them-
selves in raising up their own posterity and nurturing, protecting, and providing the best
opportunities for the bearers of their hopes, their dreams, their genetic code, and their
own unfulfilled aspirations. Parents also act as trustees for society, which has great
interests, both immediate and long-term, in the care and rearing of children. Parentage
law is important because society must identify the adults responsible for supporting and
rearing children. The law of parentage sends an important message to both adults and
children about social expectations of intergenerational responsibility. It encourages the
welfare of children by giving legal incentive to their parents to provide for their support
and socialization and by identifying the adults who have these responsibilities.
Marital parentage by biological parents provides the optimal setting for child-
rearing. Every child deserves the legacy of being born within the bonds of matrimony
with a mother and father who love each other and their children. Every child deserves
to be born to parents who are totally committed to the welfare of the child and their
family. Every child deserves to be reared by a father and a mother who honor each
other with complete fidelity. Parentage law should confirm that principle and emphasize
that parents have a critical responsibility to raise their children in love, to provide
275 Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 13 (Susan A. Bandes ed.
1999).
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for their physical, emotional, and educational needs, and to encourage them to develop
their talents. The protective value to children of having both a legal father and a legal
mother who are married to each other is undeniable. Our legal policy should protect
and promote that form of parentage.
While looking for ways to value and recognize other child-rearing relations and
forms as social structures shift and alter, the law must not forget the advantages and
lose the legacy of marital, biological parenting. The recent past indicates that the
near future will offer many challenges. Childbearing out of wedlock continues to
rise, cohabitation is increasing, and marriage continues to be unstable. The law
must strive to provide the best child-rearing opportunities for many children who
are born in sub-optimal family circumstances, without undermining the integrity or
denigrating value of the optimal child-rearing environment. Extremes in theory
must be rejected, for they put ideology above children. Balancing the "is" and the
"ought" in parentage law, for the sake of all children, requires that parentage law
recognize and protect effective forms of parenting in order to protect the substance
of optimal parenting, as well as recognize subordinate alternative quasi-parental
relationships that manifest stable and promising child-rearing substance.
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